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SUMMARY
In this dissertation I analyze the impact of factors such as competition, technology
and consumer behavior on the pricing and quality decisions of firms and service
providers, as well as how certain pricing strategies can lead to unintended effects.
In Chapter 1, I show three results pertaining to a firm selling to buyers who focus
more on the salient attribute of a product relative to other attributes. First, the
firm can make more profit by making quality salient (i.e. make the buyer focus on
quality, not price). Second, whether the firm can make quality the salient attribute
to the buyers depends on the firm’s cost of upgrading quality and consumers’ prefer-
ences for quality upgrades. Third, the firm can profitably deviate from the optimal
price-discriminating menu of price and quality by granting an additional discount to
consumers who value quality more or by downgrading quality of the low-quality good.
In Chapter 2, using data on Uber and Lyft trips and complaints against taxi
drivers, I show that increased competition from Uber has led to more complaints
regarding unsafe driving, refused pick-ups etc. by taxi drivers, which is opposite to
what one would expect.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I show three new unintended effects of price-matching. First,
a price-match guarantee may decrease firms’ incentives to invest in reducing costs.
Second, it may reduce the incentive to invest in enhancing quality. Third, without
price-matching, low-cost firms produce too little relative to the social optimum and I
show that price-matching can aggravate this problem by allowing high-cost firms to
steal further market share.
xii
CHAPTER 1
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND SALIENCE
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, I combine the standard vertical differentiation model and the model of
salience to analyze the price and quality decisions of a monopolist facing consumers
who are “salient” thinkers, both when it can and when it cannot identify buyer types.
Often decision-makers focus too much on one attribute relative to the other attributes
that make up the choice context. In the case of choosing a price-quality pair, Bordalo
et al. (2015a) show that while standard1 thinkers focus equally on price and quality,
the two attributes in this choice context, salient thinkers will overweight quality or
price depending on whichever is salient. As a result of over-weighting price or quality,
salient buyers choices differ from those of standard buyers. This in turn can affect
the menu of quality-price pairs the firm will offer.
It is important for such a firm to understand whether price or quality should be
made salient to the buyer in order to maximize profits. Furthermore, it is important
to understand how price discrimination helps or hinders inducing such salience (price-
or quality-salience, whichever is more profitable) and vice versa. In other words, the
twin goals of discriminating on price and inducing salience can interact, which can
result in significantly different outcomes in equilibrium. I provide the first systematic
analysis of these differences.
With both types of price discrimination, I show that the monopolist prefers to
make quality salient in the eyes of the consumer. Then for each case I show what
1I use the word ‘standard’ to refer to consumers as described in the traditional Econ literature who
do not display any non-standard behavior due to irrationality or bounded rationality or something
else.
1
determines whether it will succeed in making quality salient or not. The answer
depends on consumer preferences for quality and the cost of upgrading quality and
the type of price discrimination it can engage in.
In the case of first-degree price discrimination, price is salient when the cost of
improving quality is convex. However, neither price nor quality is salient when cost
is linear. The reason for this is that the monopolist is able to fully transfer to the
buyer any cost of increasing quality when it can identify buyer types. With linear
cost, doubling the quality leads to doubling the cost and hence price. Hence, quality
and price ratios are the same for all products sold by the firm, leading to no feature
becoming salient in the eyes of the buyer. However, with convex cost, doubling the
quality leads to more than double the increase in cost and price, raising the ratio of
prices relative to that of quality, which lead to price-salience. I then show that with
linear cost, the monopolist can increase profits by inducing quality salience by selling
the high-quality good at a discount, something that it would not do with standard
buyers.
When the monopolist cannot distinguish between buyer types, the information
rent and downward distortion in quality from second-degree price discrimination
changes the outcomes in terms of salience. Moreover, both the shape of the cost
function and that of the utility function now play a role. While price remains salient
with sufficiently convex costs, quality can become salient by default when utility for
quality is concave enough. In the case of linear costs, while neither price nor quality
is salient in the first-degree case, the standard discount given to the high-type buyer
and the degradation in quality of the low-quality good under second-degree price
discrimination means that the prices of the two goods move closer and the qualities
move farther apart, resulting in quality-salience.
2
Figure 1.1: Attraction Effect, Compromise Effect and Similarity Effect
1.2 Related literature
Papers such as Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006)
document systematic deviations of consumers from standard behavior and model firm
strategy exploiting such behavior. This paper contributes to this growing literature
on what is now called “behavioral industrial organization”2 by showing a specific
instance of how a firm exploits salient behavior by consumers.
Preferences affected by salient thinking is one manifestation of reference-dependent
or context-dependent preferences. Huber et al. (1982) consider adding a product to a
buyer’s choice set of two existing products A and B. I portray this in Figure 1 using
two attributes of several car models – miles per gallon (mpg) and horsepower. This
new item C is clearly inferior to one of the original alternatives but not the other, i.e.
car C has less horsepower and mpg than car B. The presence of this new alternative,
a “decoy” good, increases the attractiveness of the now “asymmetrically dominating”
alternative.3. They name this the “attraction effect”. Simonson (1989) builds on this
2See Ellison (2006), Spiegler (2011) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2015) for detailed literature reviews and
book-length treatments on Behavioral Industrial Organization.
3For an actual example, see (Ariely, 2008) The author points out how the The Economist
newspaper had three subscription offers – print, digital and print+digital. The latter two were the
same price. In an experiment, a higher fraction of MBA students chose the print+digital when the
3
by introducing the “compromise effect”. An alternative’s choice probability increases
when it becomes a compromise or middle alternative, even if there is no superiority
relationship; adding D in Figure 1 increases the market share of B relative to A
because B is now a compromise between A and D.4 The “similarity effect” says D
should steal more share from B rather than A because of higher substitutability
between B and D. A similar inconsistency is that of “choice overload”. When offered
more choices, customers’ likelihood of buying any one of the items decreases (Iyengar
and Lepper, 2000).
All of the above effects violate the assumption of “independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives”. standard buyers will always buy the item that maximizes their utility
regardless of the presence of alternatives in his choice set. The existence of theses vio-
lations led to attempts to explain such behavior. While these attempts have diverged
on significant details, the common theme is that preferences are context-dependent.
An early paper modeling context-dependent preferences is by Tversky and Simonson
(1993). More recently, Kamenica (2008) tries to explain the compromise effect and
Cunningham (2011) models being exposed to a larger value along some dimension that
makes a person less sensitive to marginal differences along that dimension. Kőszegi
and Szeidl (2012)’s “focusing” model states that a person focuses more on attributes
in which her options differ more. Bushong et al. (2015)’s “relative thinking” model
on the other hand states that a person weighs a given change along a consumption
dimension by less when it is compared to larger changes along that dimension. Azar
(2007) builds a similar model of relative thinking.
As I elaborate in Section 1.3.1, these papers are essentially trying to capture two
features of human sensory perception – one that is prone to notice bigger differences
vs. those that are small, and the other that is less capable of noticing big differences
when all items in a context are bigger. While models on focusing, relative thinking
digital-only option was offered alongside it, compared to when it wasn’t.
4This figure is a modified version of Figure B from Simonson (1989).
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etc. capture one of these two features or the other but not both at the same time,
Bordalo, Gennaioli and Schleifer, in a series of papers, build a model of “salient
thinking” that incorporate both.5
Bordalo et al. (2012) attempt to explain the Allais paradox, preference reversals
and other puzzling behavior of decisions makers choosing under risk using the theory
of salience. For example, adding a lottery that is clearly dominated by another lottery
already in the choice set makes the riskiness of the dominating lottery less salient
leading to preference reversals. Bordalo et al. (2013) apply salience to consumer
decision-making.
Bordalo et al. (2015b) analyzes judicial decisions through the lens of salience
theory. They demonstrate that judges or parties to a lawsuit may overweight salient
aspects of a case, some of which may be legally irrelevant. For instance, the presence
of a dominated settlement offer increases the salience of the dominating offer and
leads to a higher probability of acceptance by the salient plaintiff, relative to the
standard plaintiff.
Bordalo et al. (2015a) is perhaps the closest to my paper, where they analyze
price and quality choices by firms in a duopoly setting. They produce a result that
is similar to mine – the cost-to-quality ratio determines whether price or quality is
salient. What they didn’t consider was the issue of price discrimination. They also
did not study the interaction between how consumers value quality and the cost
structure. My analysis in this paper closes these gaps.
Several theoretical and empirical papers on salience since the papers by Bordalo,
Gennaioli and Schleifer has further established the importance of salient thinking.6
Herweg et al. (2017) show that a dominant firm facing competition from a competitive
5The word “salience” was first used to refer to such thinking by Taylor and Thompson (1982) who
state that “...salience refers to the phenomenon that when ones attention is differentially directed
to one portion of the environment rather than to others, the information contained in that portion
will receive disproportionate weighting in subsequent judgments.”
6See a detailed review by Herweg et al. (2018).
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fringe can use a decoy good to make it’s own good’s quality salient while at the same
time make the price of the competitive fringe’s good salient, thereby increasing profits.
Helfrich and Herweg (2017) attempt to explain why some brand manufacturers
impose restrictions on retailers regarding selling their high-quality products online.
They posit that the online marketplace is prone to more aggressive price competition
and hence a high price is salient to consumers buying online. Not allowing the retailer
to sell online allows the manufacturer to incentivize the retailer to invest in making
quality salient in offline sales.
Dertwinkel-Kalt (2016) consider health campaigns by the government and firms.
They show that two health campaigns, one promoting a healthy product and one
demoting an unhealthy product has asymmetric affects, with the latter being more
effective in reducing consumption of the unhealthy product. This is based on his
assumption that consumers are more familiar with the unhealthy product due to
them using it (and hence the need for the campaign to induce switching) and as a
result they overweight (negative) information on the unhealthy product more. Such
information is salient in their decision-making.
Early empirical evidence supporting salient thinking comes from Chetty et al.
(2009). Using a field experiment in a grocery store, they find that when tax is
included in posted prices, consumers buy 8% less than if tax was not posted but only
charged at time of purchase. By posting the tax along with the price, the store made
the tax salient. standard buyers would not fail to factor in the tax.
Hastings and Shapiro (2013) study uniform price hikes of all grades of gasoline
and find more switching to lower grades than income-effects can explain. Bordalo et
al. (2013) argues that this is because a parallel increase in price of all grades make
the price of the high-quality gas to be salient, making the buyer more price-sensitive.
Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2017) uses a lab experiment on choice of internet services and
find similar results.
6
Aside from reference-dependent preferences and salience, the results in this paper
also add to the literature on price discrimination in the presence of consumers with
non-standard preferences, such as Carbajal and Ely (2016) who analyze price dis-
crimination when consumers are loss-averse and find downward distortion beyond the
standard distortion in Mussa and Rosen (1978). In this paper, I show a distortion in
prices in the first-degree price-discrimination case with salient consumers while there
is no such distortion with standard buyers.
Armstrong (2016) shows how results that apply to quantity discounts and non-
linear pricing in general can be re-interpreted in the context of quality instead of
quantity.7 While the literature on vertical differentiation tends to use linear utility for
analysis, I consider both linear and non-linear utility and show that non-linearity can
impact which product feature becomes salient. Such non-linearity in utility leading
to non-linear pricing results not in quantity discounts but rather discounts for higher
units of quality.
The rest of the paper is as follows. I describe the necessary components of the
theory of salience in Section 1.3.1 to facilitate the analysis that follows. In Section
1.3.2, I describe the model of vertical differentiation I use for the rest of the paper.
Exogenous and endogenous quality are analyzed in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 respectively.
I discuss whether price- or quality-salience is more profitable in Section 1.6 and how
to induce the more profitable kind of salience. I conclude in Section 2.7.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Salience Theory
Human sensory perception tend to display two features. First, they are designed to
detect variations in stimuli. In a small town with one tall building, we notice that
7Belleflamme and Peitz (2015) does the reverse by introducing the Mussa-Rosen quality model first
and re-interprets it to analyze quantity discounts.
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building before we notice the other buildings, i.e. the tall building is more “salient”.
Second, human senses are less sensitive to increasing changes in stimuli. So in a large
city with many skyscrapers, the tallest of them stand out less in our eyes. In other
words, the salience of the tallest building decreases with uniform increases in height
of all buildings. A salience function (Bordalo et al., 2013) captures both of these two
features:
1. Ordering : For any x, x′, y, y′ ∈ R≥0 with [x, y] ⊂ [x′, y′], then σ(x, y) < σ(x′, y′).
2. Diminishing sensitivity : For all x, y ∈ R≥0 and α > 0, it holds that σ(α+x, α+
y) < σ(x, y).
The “ordering” property states that the difference between two features is more no-
ticeable when they are farther apart. Continuing with the example of tall buildings,
a 10-story building will stand out more when all the other buildings are 2-stories be-
cause there is a difference of 8 floors between it and the rest whereas any individual
2-story building does not differ from the remaining 2-story buildings at all and hence
does not stand out. The “diminishing sensitivity” property implies that a 50-story
building will be less salient when all the other buildings are 42-stories, relative to the
previous example of 10 and 2-story buildings despite the fact that the difference is 8
floors in both cases.
Note that an increase in the number of floors of the tallest building increases the
salience of that building (ordering effect) but also increases the average height of all
buildings thereby decreasing salience (diminishing sensitivity effect). So a function
that captures salience should incorporate this trade-off. Ensuring that the salience
function satisfies ordering and homogeneity of degree 0 successfully achieves that.
This is because together with ordering, homogeneity of degree 0 implies diminishing
sensitivity.8
8In fact, homogeneity of degree 0 is a stronger condition than diminishing sensitivity. For more
8
Homogeneity of degree 0 implies σ(α · ak, α · ā) = σ(ak, ā), that is, scaling up or
down all the values in a set does not affect the salience of any one of them. More
importantly, a salience function with the homogeneity of degree 0 property captures
the trade-off between ordering and diminishing sensitivity by ensuring that the former
dominates the latter if and only if the change in an attribute ak of element k is greater
than the resulting change in the attribute average ā in that set and vice versa.
To proceed with the analysis of price and quality choice by a firm facing salient
consumers, let a consumer choose from a set of goods called the “consideration set”
C ≡ {(qk, pk)}k=1,...N with each good k having price pk and quality qk. The “reference
good” in C is the good with the average price p̄ and average quality q̄. Then, Bordalo
et al. (2013) prove the following result:
Lemma 1. If the consumers’ salience function is homogeneous of degree 0, and goods
k, L and H do not dominate nor are dominated by the reference good, then










(ii) In the case of two goods H (high-quality) and L (low-quality), quality is salient









To see why this is true, note that due to homogeneity of degree 0, the salience of
good k’s quality σ(qk, q̄) and price σ(pk, p̄) can be expressed as σ(
qk
q̄
, 1) and σ(pk
p̄
, 1)




are larger than one. The ordering property then













is in the Appendix.
Note that while quality of good k alone is salient in the N good case and we do
not know about the salience of price or quality of the other goods without further
about the relationship between ordering, homogeneity of degree 0 and diminishing sensitivity, see
Footnote 3 of Bordalo et al. (2013). They show that most of the predictions of salience theory hold
with this stricter assumption.
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information, quality (or price) is salient for both goods in the two-good case. To









hence the lower quality of Good L is salient at the same time when the higher quality
of Good H is salient. So while the consumer overvalues both goods, he/she overvalues
the high-quality good more.
Lemma 1 provides the key result that will allow us to determine when quality
becomes salient and when price becomes salient, given specific consumer preferences
and technology of quality upgrades. In particular, it implies quality will be salient in
the eyes of the buyer when the ratio of qualities of two goods is greater than their
price-ratio whereas price will be salient if the price-ratio is larger. Note that this
effectively translates to salient thinkers focusing on the attribute whose features show
bigger (relative) differences than attributes whose features show smaller (relative)
differences. For instance the requirement of quality-salience, that the quality-ratio

















which means that buyers will focus on the the qualities of two products if the per-
centage difference in quality among the two items is greater than the percentage gap
in prices. If a buyer is choosing between Printer A priced at $100 and Printer B
priced at $120 and the printing speeds are 100 pages per minute (ppm) and 150 ppm
respectively, then the price gap is 20% and the quality gap (quality here being the
printing speed) is 50%. Thus, the buyer’s attention will be more on the printing speed
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and less on price.9
It is worth pointing out that there can be several ways a feature of a product can
become salient in the eyes of the buyer. The specific reason of percentage differences
in price vs. quality causing salience of one or the other, is just one such mechanism.
Another way may be the way the price and quality information is presented to the
buyer such as the font size and color of the writing. Similarly, quality may be the
focus of consumers in Starbucks and price the focus in Walmart regardless of price
vs. quality differences between products because of store decorations or marketing
slogans that aim to induce buyers to focus on price vs. quality. Having recognized
such alternative means through which salience of particular attributes can arise, I
now proceed with the definition of salience as used by BGS and others in the Salience
literature and defined above in Lemma 1.
To incorporate salience into the utility function of consumers, I use the following
class of utility functions, which is a modified version of the utility function used in
Bordalo et al. (2015a):






if σ(qk, q̄) > σ(pk, p̄)
δ if σ(qk, q̄) < σ(pk, p̄)
1 if σ(qk, q̄) = σ(pk, p̄)
and 0 < δ ≤ 1 is the degree of salience. δ = 1 implies “standard” consumer behav-
ior whereas a consumer approaches full salience as δ → 0. When quality is salient,
it is overweighted by the factor 1
δ
. If price is salient on the other hand, quality is
underweighted by the factor δ relative to price, which is just a monotonic transfor-
9The quality ratio is 1.25 and the price ratio is 1 in this case. As the quality-ratio is greater, we
reach the same conclusion of quality-salience in two alternative but similar ways.
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mation of the utility function u(θ, q) − 1
δ
p where price is overweighted. In contrast,
standard buyers do not overweight either attribute and hence has the utility function
u(θ, q)− p regardless of which attribute is salient.
θ ∈ [0, 1] is the taste parameter for quality that varies across consumers. A higher
θ indicates a higher valuation for quality. q ≥ 0 and p ≥ 0 are quality and price of the
good respectively. I make the following assumption for the above class of functions:
Assumption 1. uS is based on a salience function that satisfies ordering and homo-
geneity of degree 0.
I also assume throughout the paper that δ is exogenous and homogeneous across
consumers.
1.3.2 Vertical Differentiation
I use the standard vertical differentiation model with two types of consumers. A
monopolist sells two products, high-quality good H and low-quality good L, to two
groups of consumers with differing taste parameters – fraction λ of “high-type” buyers
with taste parameter θH and fraction 1−λ of “low-type” buyers with taste parameter
θL. I assume θH > θL i.e. high-type buyer values a given quality more than low-type.
The total mass of consumers is normalized to 1.
To keep the analysis tractable, I assume simple functional forms for utility and
cost. The utility function
U(θ, q) = ∆θqb − p (1.2)
may be linear for b = 1 or concave U(θ, q) = ∆θqb − p for 0 < b < 1 or convex for
b > 1. Each buyer buys either one unit of H or one unit of L, or neither.
On the firm side, if quality is endogenous, marginal cost of an additional unit of
quality
C(q) = cqa (1.3)
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is made up of two components. c captures the component that is independent of
quality, i.e. it is the fixed marginal cost of producing one more unit. qa captures
the variable component that changes with quality. C(q) may be linear in quality for
a = 1 or convex for a > 1 or concave for a < 1.10 If quality is exogenous however, let
C(qH) = cH and C(qL) = cL.
To motivate the use of linear and concave preferences for quality, I present a couple
of examples. Car tires usually have mileage ratings to indicate the number of miles of
use the buyer may expect from them. Higher ratings is higher quality in this context.
It is reasonable to claim that, ceteris paribus, the buyer will value a tire with a rating
of 50,000 miles twice as much as a tire with a rating of 25,000 miles. In other words,
utility is approximately linear over the relevant quality range.
In contrast, there are diminishing returns in utility to have faster microprocessors
in computers, smartphones etc., speed being the measure of quality in this case. This
is because a processor that is twice as fast in clock speed relative to another processor
will not double the speed of completing tasks on a computer unless other components
such as RAM and hard drive are also upgraded to prevent bottlenecks. Further,
except advanced users, users do not always get to fully utilize the additional speed
for everyday tasks.
Now consider linear and convex costs of upgrading quality. If the duration of a
battery is proportional to the number of cells it has inside and if the marginal cost
of each cell is constant, then a battery that lasts twice as long would cost twice as
much and would reflect a linear cost function.
On the other hand, steel and carbon fiber used in production of bikes11 and cars
provide a good example of convex costs. While the production of steel is heavily
10While cases of convex utility and concave costs may be uncommon, I am keeping the analysis
general to accommodate such (unlikely) possibilities.
11I mean here cycles and not motorbikes. While carbon fiber bikes are very common, this is not yet
the case for motorbikes.
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automated, production of carbon fiber requires significant labor.12 Heavier cars are
less fuel-efficient and heavier bikes are slower and hence the weight of the item is the
dimension of quality in this context. While a bike made of carbon fiber may be 50%
lighter than a steel bike, it is usually a lot more than 50% more expensive to produce
than the steel bike. Similar observations can be made regarding regular cars made of
steel and sports cars with carbon fiber components.
While the specific examples I use here may or may not reflect the true functional
forms that match cost data and consumer behavior, the important thing is to realize
there are differences in production technology and how consumers value additional
quality across different products and services.




π = λ(p− cqaH) + (1− λ)(p− cqaL) (1.4)
subject to the following participation and incentive compatibility constraints
∆θLq
b
L − pL ≥ 0 PC for low-type
∆θHq
b
H − pH ≥ 0 PC for high-type
∆θLq
b
L − pL ≥ ∆θLqbH − pH IC for low-type
∆θHq
b
H − pH ≥ ∆θHqbL − pL IC for high-type
The subset of constraints that will bind in a given situation will depend on whether
the monopolist can or cannot observe consumer type.




I begin with the less complicated case of exogenous quality. This may either be
because the firm is making decisions in the short-run and can only change price or
because of some regulation requiring quality to be at a certain level or some other
reason. The monopolist maximizes
max
pH ,pL
π = λ(∆pH − cH) + (1− λ)(∆pL − cL) (1.5)
where cH > cL are the exogenous per-unit cost of producing the high- and low-quality
goods respectively.
1.4.1 First Degree Price Discrimination
I first consider the case of two types of buyers and the monopolist can identify
their types and hence engages in first-degree price discrimination (FD). Incentive-




L and pH = ∆θHq
b
H (1.6)











Given θH > θL, we note immediately that the price ratio is greater than the quality
ratio if utility is linear in quality upgrades (b = 1), and hence price is salient. In
general, quality will be salient only if the utility function is sufficiently concave




The reason is as follows. Strongly diminishing utility to improvements in quality (low
value of b) limits the firm’s ability to charge a price for the high-quality good that
is much higher than that of the low-quality good. This results in a large quality gap
between the two goods but not as large a price gap, leading to quality-salience.
To ensure positive profits, optimal prices charged must be greater than the cost of
the products. These necessary conditions are pH = θHq
b
H > cH and pL = θLq
b
L > cL










This implies that diminishing utility to higher quality cannot be so rapid that it
prevents the firm from profitably selling the two goods. In such a case, it would
result in a pooling equilibrium with the firm selling either the high- or low-quality
good alone to both customers.
It should be noted here that the parameter a capturing the shape of the cost-
upgrade function plays no role in this analysis for obvious reasons. Because quality
is exogenous, the only that thing matters from the cost perspective is the ratio cH
cL
which has an impact on the lower bound of b as can be seen above.
1.4.2 Second Degree Price Discrimination
If the monopolist cannot identify buyers types and hence engages in second-degree
price discrimination, we know from the standard principal-agent model with hidden
information (Laffont and Martimort, 2009) that only the participation constraint for




L and pH = ∆(θHq
b
H − (θH − θL)qbL) (1.10)
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H − (θH − θL)qbL
θLqbL
(1.11)
Price is salient if
θHq
b















For the linear case b = 1, it can be easily shown that the LHS of (1.12) is greater,
i.e. price is salient. In general, quality will be salient only if the utility function is
sufficiently concave
b <
lnθH − ln(θH − θL)
lnqH − lnqL
≡ b̄SD
The intuition for this condition is similar to that in the first-degree case. Sufficient










The results for the exogenous quality cases are summarized in the following proposi-
ton:
Proposition 1. With exogenous quality and the
(i) ability to identify buyer types, quality is salient if bFD < b < b̄FD. For b > b̄FD,
price is salient.
(ii) inability to identify buyer types, quality is salient if bSD < b < b̄SD. For b > b̄SD,
price is salient.
13The more complicated expressions of prices and qualities under second-degree price discrimination
make it less tractable to generate necessary conditions similar to those found for the case of
first-degree price discrimination. Hence I suffice with sufficient conditions.
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1.5 Endogenous Quality
1.5.1 First Degree Price Discrimination





















i = L,H (1.14)



























To ensure pH > pL and qH > qL,
14 we must have:
Assumption 2. a > b, i.e. the cost function is more convex (or less concave) than
the utility function.












⇐⇒ a > 1 (1.16)
For a = 1, i.e. linear costs, neither price nor quality is salient (or equivalently, price
and quality are equally salient). I summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. With endogenous quality and first-degree price discrimination,
(i) price is salient if cost of upgrading quality is convex,
14The second-order conditions require the same assumption. See Appendix 1.8.3.
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(ii) neither price nor quality is salient when cost is linear,
(iii) quality is salient if cost is concave.
The intuition for this is straightforward. Because the monopolist can distinguish
between buyer types, it passes on all costs of upgrading quality to them. When cost of
upgrading quality is linear, price rises proportionally with quality. If for instance the
high-quality good is twice as superior in quality than the low-quality good, the price
of the former will also be twice as much. This leads to the same price-quality ratios
for both goods. Indeed this result can be easily extended for the n-buyer n-good case
as long as first-degree price discrimination is feasible.
If on the other hand cost is convex, doubling the quality will entail incurring more
than double the cost and hence more than double the price. This then leads to a
lower quality-per-dollar for the high-quality good and hence price becomes salient.
1.5.2 Second Degree Price Discrimination
Using the participation constraint for the low-type and incentive compatibility con-
straint for the high-type, we have
pL = ∆θLq
b
L and pH = ∆(θHq
b
H − (θH − θL)qbL)





H − (θH − θL)qbL)− cqaH) + (1− λ)(∆θLqbL − cqaL) (1.17)

















































where Θ = θL − λ1−λ(θH − θL).
To ensure positive price and quality for the low-quality good, we must have Θ > 0
or λ < θL
θH
. Hence I make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. λ < θL
θH
. The fraction of high-types is sufficiently low.15
This is what Mussa and Rosen (1978) pointed out – that a sufficiently high fraction
of high-types will squeeze out the low-types from the market. The monopolist can
reduce the information rent it gives to the high-type by lowering the quality of the
good bought by the low-type. This downward distortion in quality of the low-quality
good deters the high-type from buying it and relaxes the need for the monopolist to
lower the price of the high-quality good. Higher the fraction of high-types vis-a-vis
low-types, greater the impact of such downward distortion in the quality of the low-
quality good on reducing the information rent for the high-types. A sufficiently high
fraction of high-types drives the quality of the low-quality good to zero. In other
words, the monopolist sells the high-quality good only. An alternative way to express
Assumption 3 is that, given a fraction of high-type customers, the taste parameter
for the low-type must be sufficiently close to that of the high-type θL > λθH . If the
low-type values quality much less than the high-type, it will not be profitable to cater
to them while persuading the high-type to not buy the low-quality good.
What is important in this paper’s context is that salience is relevant only in
situations of more than one good. By definition of salience discussed above, the
quality or price of a good stands out in the eyes of the buyer when contrasted with
that of the “reference” good. But with only one good in the consumer’s choice set,
15Again, second-order conditions require this also. See Appendix 1.8.3.
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the high-quality good is the reference good itself, and hence the need for Assumption
3 to ensure that the monopolist sells two goods.
Given optimal prices and qualities above, the quality-ratio is larger than the price-













Unlike in the first-degree case, the parameter b capturing the shape of the utility
function does play a role. We will consider two general cases. First if a − b → ∞,
i.e. the cost function is sufficiently convex (which can be alternatively expressed as










< θL ⇐⇒ 1 < θH
which is not true. Hence price is salient when the cost function is sufficiently convex,












< θL ⇐⇒ Θ < θH
which is true since Θ < θL < θH . Thus, quality is salient if the utility function is
sufficiently concave. From the above two cases, we can see that there is a tug-of-war
between convexity of cost and concavity of utility. While increasing convexity in cost
of upgrading quality pushes prices of the two goods farther apart and hence pulls
towards price-salience, diminishing returns to quality squeezes prices closer together
and thus pulls towards quality-salience.
Recall that under first-degree price discrimination and linear cost, neither price
nor quality is salient. To contrast with second-degree price discrimination, consider
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Figure 1.2: Quality-salience in second-degree price discrimination


















which holds because the LHS is negative and both terms of the RHS are positive.
Therefore, quality is salient unlike in the first-degree case. Figure 1.2 provides the
intuition for this contrast in results between the first- and second-degree cases. Two
things that result from the monopolist’s desire to screen high-types from low-types is
the information rent given to the high-type and the downward distortion in quality
of the low-quality good. So, when cost of upgrading quality is linear resulting in
equality price- and quality-ratios under first-degree price discrimination case (as seen
in the top part of Figure 1.2), the information rent decreases the gap between the
two prices while the downward distortion increases the quality gap.
Proposition 3. With endogenous quality and second-degree price discrimination,
(i) price is salient as a→∞ and b is fixed,
(ii) quality is salient as b→ 0 and a is fixed.
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1.6 Profit from Salient Consumers
1.6.1 Quality vs. Price Salience – Which is more profitable?
So far I have analyzed whether price or quality becomes salient through standard
price-discrimination. But which is more profitable – quality- or price-salience? First,
consider first-degree price discrimination. From (1.14) in Section 1.5.1, we can express










































































While the monopolist can charge a higher price under quality-salience, it provides
a higher quality and hence incurs a higher cost also. For the high-quality good,
profit from quality-salience will be larger than profit from price-salience if the price-





































⇐⇒ a > b (1.21)
which is satisfied under Assumption 2. By similar logic, profit from selling the low-
quality good under quality-salience is more profitable than under price-salience. This
result should not be surprising since quality-salience makes customers willing to pay
more for the same quality, whereas price-salience makes them willing to pay less for
the same quality. As a result, the monopolist can charge a higher price without
having to incur the cost to upgrade quality when quality is salient, and profits are
higher.
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Next, consider second-degree price discrimination. From (1.19) in Section 1.5.2,
























































































































which is a stricter requirement than Assumption 2. The following proposition sum-
marizes:
Proposition 4. Quality-salience is always more profitable than price-salience under
first-degree price-discrimination but only sometimes more profitable under second-
degree price discrimination.
1.6.2 Inducing Quality-Salience
It can be shown that with linear costs, the monopolist can induce quality-salience
when price is salient by default. In the previous section, I show that under first-
degree price discrimination, profit from quality-salience is always higher than from
price-salience or no-salience. I now show that the monopolist, by giving a sufficiently
small discount to the high-type, can induce quality-salience when costs rise linearly
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with the upgrade of quality. Instead of charging pH , the monopolist will charge
p′H = pH − ε to the high-type. The modified high-type participation constraint
does not bind: p′H <
θH
δ




qbH − ε instead of pH = θHδ q
b







qbH − ε− cqH) + (1− λ)(
θL
δ









































1−b πNS − λε where πNS is profit when neither price nor quality is salient. Hence
















gain from inducing quality salience
> λε︸︷︷︸
total discount given to high-types
(1.24)
I make a few remarks here. First, with δ = 1, i.e. with standard thinkers, giving a
discount would never be a good idea. Second, (1.24) provides an intuitive expression
that shows inducing quality-salience is profitable only when the gain from doing
so exceeds the discount given to high-types to achieve such salience. Third, this
inequality is harder to satisfy with a higher fraction λ of high-types or larger drops
in marginal utility from quality upgrades (lower b or more concave utility function).
The reason why an increase in λ makes it harder is simple – more high-types mean a
larger total discount conditional on a fixed discount per high-type buyer. The reason
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why a more concave utility function makes it harder is because increases in quality
is over-weighted less due to greater diminishing utility from such quality increases.
Lower the distortion in weighting of quality vis-a-vis price by the salient buyer, closer
is the profits from quality-salience to profits from no salience. Finally, unless there is
a lower bound on the discount ε, this inequality (1.24) can always be satisfied for a
sufficiently small ε. The following proposition formally states the result:
Proposition 5. With endogenous cost and first-degree price discrimination, the mo-
nopolist can induce quality salience by providing a sufficiently small discount to the
high-type and increase its profits relative to the default outcome of no salience.
1.7 Conclusion
When consumers are attracted to certain features of a product more than others and
overvalue those features, I show using a standard vertical differentiation model that a
price-discriminating monopolist attempts to take advantage of such “salient” thinking
by the consumers. I study both first-degree and second-degree price discrimination
and demonstrate three novel results.
First, the firm always prefers quality to be salient due to higher profits under first-
degree price discrimination and sometimes prefers quality-salience with second-degree
price discrimination. Second, whether or not it manages to induce quality-salience
depends on the interaction between consumer preferences for quality and the cost of
upgrading quality and the type of price discrimination it can engage in. In the case
of first-degree price discrimination, price is salient if the cost of upgrading quality
is convex whereas neither price nor quality is salient when cost increases linearly in
quality upgrades. This is because, in the first-best case when the monopolist extracts
full surplus from both types of consumers, it passes on all costs to the buyers. Convex
costs mean that doubling quality leads to more than double the cost and hence price,
which in turn lead to a lower quality-per-dollar for the good, making the high price
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salient. But linear costs do not have that same impact. Third, I show that the
monopolist can induce quality-salience with linear costs by giving a small discount
for the high-quality good to make the price ratio decrease and quality becomes salient.
When the firm cannot distinguish between buyer types, the information rent ac-
cruing to the high-valuation buyer and the downward distortion in quality of the
low-quality good raises the quality ratio and lowes the price ratio so that quality
becomes salient by default. In other words, the information rent and quality degra-
dation serves two purposes – discourage the high-type from buying the low-quality
good as in the standard model and make quality salient due to buyers being salient
thinkers. If however, quality-upgrade costs are sufficiently convex, price is salient.
The analysis does have limitations. Ensuring tractability meant that utility and
cost functions had to take specific forms. However, the literature on price discrimina-
tion has been even more restrictive on the choice of function forms, usually limiting
study to linear utilities and costs. Tirole (1988) provide intuition for this linear form.
Given this context, my attempt to study concave preferences for quality is a step
forward despite using specific functions to model it.
It may be argued also that quality is often not quantifiable. While tire ratings
can be given in miles, is a business-class seat twice as good as an economy-class seat?
However, this did not stop the literature on quality provision and price discrimination
(Spence (1975), Mussa and Rosen (1978) etc.) from analyzing firm strategy and
consumer welfare. In this paper’s context, while quality-price ratios play a pivotal
role, it is not necessary to have exact quality numbers in the minds of buyers for them
to be influenced by the salience of price or quality.
I have also made the assumption that all consumers have a uniform salience pa-
rameter δ, i.e. they overweight or underweight the salient attribute at the same
intensity. Homogeneity of preferences for quality upgrades across buyer types is not
always true either. Moreover, it is possible that the convexity or concavity of cost
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of quality upgrades may be different across products. Allowing heterogeneity in the
salience parameter and preference and technology parameters are interesting exten-
sions to my model and worth further investigation.
Another issue to note is that in the current setup price is salient even if the price-
ratio is greater than the quality-ratio by a tiny margin and a similar issue is true
when quality is salient even though the quality-ratio is only slightly bigger than the
price-ratio. A more realistic model will make the salience parameter δ a function of
the quality- and price- ratios. If, for example, the quality-ratio is slightly larger than
the price-ratio, then δ takes a small value. If on the other hand, the quality-ratio is
substantially larger than the price-ratio, then δ is also larger.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Salience in the two-good case








, note that q̄ = qH+qL
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1.8.2 Profit from quality-salience expressed in terms of profit from no salience






a−b for i = L,H
in the case of first-degree price discrimination. Specifically, optimal quality when





1−b whereas optimal quality when
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Endogenous Quality: First-Degree Price Discrimination














The second derivatives are:
∂2πFD
∂q2H












(b− 1)bλθHqb−2H < λ(a− 1)acq
a−2
H ⇐⇒ a > b




















Endogenous Quality: Second-Degree Price Discrimination















The second derivatives are:
∂2πSD
∂q2H






= (b− 1)b(1− λ)θLqb−2L − (1− λ)(a− 1)acq
a−2






(b− 1)bλθHqb−2H < λ(a− 1)acq
a−2
H ⇐⇒ a > b
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which is the same condition as under first-degree price discrimination since the deriva-
tive has not changed. However, now the second derivative in regards to the low-quality




[(b− 1)b(1− λ)θL − (b− 1)bλθH − θL)] qb−2L < (1− λ)(a− 1)acq
a−2
L ⇐⇒ a > bΘ̂
where Θ̂ = θL−λθH
θL− λ1−λ (θH−θL)
. Θ̂ is less than 1 if λθH < θL, which is true under Assump-
tion 3. Since Θ̂ < 1, the condition a > bΘ̂ is weaker than the condition a > b and is
thus satisfied if a > b.






are again both 0. The condition





> 0 and hence the Hessian is negative definite and
(qSDH , q
SD
L ) are maxima.
1.8.4 Condition for Separating Equilibrium
Salience will only arise if the firm sells two goods instead of one. To ensure a separating
equilibrium, i.e. the firm sells two different goods to two customers instead of a
pooling equilibrium whereby it sells to both customers either the low-quality or high-
quality but does not offer both goods at the same time, the condition is that going
from low to high quality increases surplus proportionally more for high-type customers










This too is satisfied if a > b, i.e. Assumption 2.
16See pg. 225 of (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2015) for the exact condition that I use here.
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CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACT OF UBER AND LYFT ON TAXI SERVICE QUALITY:
EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK CITY
The arrival of ride-sharing services1 such as Uber and Lyft has extensively changed
many aspects of our lives. In less than four years after entry, the total number of
Uber and Lyft trips surpassed the number of taxi trips in New York City (Figure 2.1).
Their importance is reflected by the growing body of literature studying the effects of
ride-sharing on labor supply patterns, public transit usage, congestion, road fatalities
and more.
In this paper, we focus on how the entry of such ride-sharing services has affected
service quality provided by taxi drivers in New York City. We do this by looking
at changes in the number of complaints made against these taxi drivers. Taxi riders
or pedestrians can make calls to 311, a service offered by most U.S. cities that is
similar to 911 but for non-emergency purposes, to complain against taxi drivers.
Complaints can relate to rude behavior, unsafe driving, fare refusal, unclean vehicles
and several other quality dimensions. Given the importance of taxis in the economy
and even greater importance of studying the effects of the sharing economy, we ask if
competition from ride-sharing services has led to taxi drivers improving or worsening
their service quality.
Economic theory predicts, all else constant, that incumbent firms will increase
quality as they face more competition to maintain market share and profits. Sev-
eral papers provide empirical evidence in favor of the positive impact of competition
1A more formal and comprehensive term is Transportation Network Companies (TNC). Since
ride-sharing has been commonly used as an equivalent term for TNCs in the media and past
literature, we stick to that convention. Also note that ride-sharing is a misnomer since the vast
majority of Uber and Lyft drivers are commercial drivers and not regular people “sharing” their
cars.
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Figure 2.1: Number of taxi and Uber/Lyft pickups
Taxi, Uber and Lyft trip data was aggregated to generate monthly data for this figure. Uber trip
data is missing from its launch in NYC in July 2012 till the end of March 2014. Uber and Lyft data
is also missing for the months October to December 2014.
on service quality in other industries: greater competition induces Internet Service
Providers (ISP) to offer higher speeds (Wilson, 2015); mergers between airlines tend
to reduce flight frequencies and increase flight delays (Mazzeo, 2003); and banks pro-
vide higher branch density and more employees per branch in larger markets where
they face more competition (Dick, 2007). Therefore, theory and empirical evidence
appear to lead us to expect that competition improves quality of service.
However, there are several issues to be aware of when we apply this general idea
to the taxi industry. First, taxi drivers normally do not have repeat passengers
which means that drivers do not have the incentive to build a reputation. Second,
reputation building may not work even at the firm-level. This is because the taxi
industry is characterized by a very low level of market share concentration, with
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the industry’s four largest players in New York accounting for less than 5.0% of
total industry revenue in 2017 (IBISWorld, 2018). Third, it is questionable to what
extent passengers pay attention to and remember the name of the taxi company they
used unlike in the case of the name of the restaurant they last ate at. The lack
of importance of taxi brand names diminishes the incentives of taxi companies to
invest in better service quality also. Thus it is not a priori clear whether increasing
competition from ride-sharing services will have a positive or negative impact on taxi
service quality.
We use novel incident-level complaints data that, to our knowledge, has not been
analyzed by anyone before. Combining this dataset with the widely used NYC taxi
trips data and Uber and Lyft trips data, we find that the growth in ride-sharing
services coincides with an increase in complaints against taxi drivers. We focus on
complaints that mostly frequently recur during the sample period.
We find evidence that taxi drivers have been driving more aggressively after the
arrival of Uber and Lyft. Complaints regarding unsafe driving have a statistically
significant positive relationship with growth in Uber and Lyft. We obtain similar
results for complaints related to route, discourteous behavior and tips given to taxi
drivers, such as failure to issue a receipt for the tip.
We also find that competition from Uber and Lyft has led at first to a rise and
then a fall in refusals by taxi drivers to take the ride to his/her destination. Pickup
refusals in theory may increase or decrease due to more competition. On the one hand,
more competition can increase the opportunity cost of time. For instance, accepting
a short-distance low-paying fare prevents the driver from potentially finding a long-
distance higher-paying fare had he waited a bit longer.2 On the other hand, more
competition leads to decreased market share which can increase the desperation of
2Anecdotal evidence reveals taxi drivers’ reluctance to accept short fares. This may be due to the
fare structure, search costs and wait times in between trips or a combination of the preceding
factors.
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taxi drivers and make them less picky about which fares to accept or refuse.
We consider a variety of alternative explanations for the rise in complaints. In-
creasing use of smartphones which may make it easier to complain, rising expectations
by riders who now have access to better cars through Uber and Lyft, decrease in en-
forcement of penalties against taxi drivers for violations and a host of other factors
may have contributed to the phenomena we document. Our results are robust to
controlling for these confounding factors.
More importantly, there may be reverse causality between complaints and Uber
and Lyft penetration. Dissatisfied passengers complain more but some of them also
stop using the service they are dissatisfied with and switch to a competitor. So higher
complaints may imply more riders are switching to ride-sharing services, leading to
both higher Uber and Lyft trips and lower taxi trips. We use instrument variables
to mitigate this concern. In particular, we use Bartik shift-shares (Bartik, 1991)
that has been used in empirical contexts similar to ours. Our IV estimation results
deliver a similar story to what we find using OLS – more competition leads to more
complaints.
Beyond showing this primary result, we investigate this relationship between pen-
etration of Uber and Lyft and taxi service quality for each of the five boroughs in
New York. Further, we look at this relationship year by year. Our results confirm ex-
pectations. Increase in most types of complaints is significant in the busiest borough
of Manhattan and are also significant in the early years after the entry of Uber (e.g.
2014 and 2015) whereas the relationship fades in later years (e.g. 2016 and 2017)
likely to the industry transitioning to a new equilibrium.
We also provide a likely cause for the uptick in complaints. Using driver-level
data, we show that high-income drivers also tend to be the ones with more complaints
against them. With Uber and Lyft capturing market share and reducing incomes,
we then show that low-income drivers stopped driving taxis more than high-income
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drivers. In other words, the high-income taxi drivers were better able to withstand
competition. But the unintended effect was that these high-income high-complaint
taxi drivers remaining with taxis and the low-income low-complaint drivers leaving
changed the decomposition of “good” vs. “bad” drivers, leading to an overall decline
in service quality, despite individual drivers not necessarily changing their behavior.
Our paper has important policy implications. For example, consider taxi riders’
complaints about pick-up refusals. A taxi driver may intentionally refuse to pick up a
passenger when he/she finds out that the rider’s destination is not attractive.3 Some
of those denied passengers may switch to alternative transport such as Uber/Lyft or
the public transit system. However, other taxi users may not be able to find such
an alternative.4 This would imply that their welfare has declined due to competition
from ride-sharing services. In addition, our empirical results support the hypothesis
that incumbent service quality may not always increase in response to new entrants
in a market where there is a relatively low market concentration and service providers
do not have repeat customers.
2.1 Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to Wallsten (2015) who study the impact of Uber on taxi
complaints in New York City and Chicago. He finds that total complaints in NYC
had been declining before Uber entered, but has declined faster since then. He also
reports that complaints of several types have declined since Uber started operating in
Chicago. There are several critical differences in methodology between our study and
his. We use incident-level complaint data by type in NYC, whereas he uses aggregate
monthly data. The higher resolution data allows us to analyze driver behavior at
the taxi-zone-level rather than at the city level. There is considerable heterogeneity
3This may be either because the destination is nearby (short rides are usually less profitable per
mile) or because it is in a high-crime area or something else.
4For example, less digitally-savvy people, perhaps from an older generation, may not be familiar
with using smart-phones to hail Uber.
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among the different parts of New York City in regards to taxi usage and also the
extent to which Uber and Lyft has penetrated. We exploit this heterogeneity and
also benefit from a panel data setting, while Wallsten, 2015 was limited to using
variation over time alone given that his cross-section was the whole city and hence
one unit. Another advantage in our approach is how we measure the penetration of
ride-sharing services into the market. Wallsten (2015) used a Google Trends variable
for the search term ‘Uber’ to proxy for competition from ride-sharing service; we use
Uber/Lyft trip-level data which is far more accurate in capturing the extent of market
penetration by these ride-sharing services.
Another study on Uber’s impact on taxi service quality is by Puranam (2017) who
reports that consumer opinion on traditional taxi services, measured by favorable
discussion in a leading online reviews portal for taxi services, improved after Uber’s
entry in San Francisco in regards to pricing and wait times. We believe the measure
we use to gauge changes in service quality, i.e. actual complaints made to taxi or city
authorities, is better than opinions expressed on a website. This is especially true for
complaints by non-passengers since a quick phone call is more likely than a website
visit.
In addition to the literature on the impact of ridesharing on taxi service quality,
our paper also contributes to the growing body of literature on the many effects of the
arrival of Uber and Lyft beyond that of taxi service quality. Shapiro (2018) finds that
Uber’s technology of matching drivers with riders provides the most benefit in the least
dense areas, i.e. those under-served by taxis, since Uber shortens the wait time more
in less dense areas. Hall et al. (2017) analyze the impact of Uber’s “surge pricing”
by utilizing a quasi-natural experiment where the Uber app temporarily stopped
working due to a technical glitch on New Year’s Eve. They show that surge pricing
can dramatically increase driver labor supply, thus resulting in an increased number
of driver-rider matches and less variation in wait times before a match. Similarly,
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Chen and Sheldon (2015) find that drivers work longer sessions and provided more
rides in response to unexpected changes in earnings from surge pricing.
The other aspect of Uber that has affected driver supply decisions is its flexible
hours. Hall and Krueger (2018) contrast demographics of Uber drivers with that of
taxi drivers and find considerably more heterogeneity among the former. In particular,
more women and younger drivers are prevalent on Uber. They posit that this is likely
due to such people having other jobs or studies and only manage to work irregular
hours on the platform, which is usually not possible with taxis.5
Our paper shares some similarity with Cook et al. (2018) in finding a link between
driver’s income and driving behvarior. They show that the gender gap in earnings
among Uber drivers is related to the extent to which they speed, their choice of
passengers, and their choice of location to pick up passengers. Their research implies
that if a taxicab driver’s income has declined due to competition from ride-sharing
service providers, their driving behavior could be affected just like those of Uber
drivers. While we cannot verify the exact linkage between a taxi driver’s income and
the driver’s driving behavior due to data limitations, it is not a stretch to conjecture
that intense competition from Uber and Lyft might have affected taxi drivers’ income
on average and thus some drivers have started to drive more aggressively to make up
for the loss in income.
There are effects on the demand side as well. Greenwood and Wattal (2015)
find that the introduction of Uber contributed to a significant drop in fatalities in
California, particularly in large cities. The effect goes away during periods of surge
pricing indicating that DUI violators were likely engaging in such practices due to
relatively higher taxi fares prior to the arrival of Uber and Lyft.
5Usually, taxi companies lease out taxis to drivers for 12-hour shifts for a fixed fee. Drivers then
decide the number of hours (up to a maximum of 12) they would like to drive. Fewer hours driven
result in lower income but with the same fixed leasing fee. Drivers therefore tend to drive a full
shift, effectively ruling out the possibility of a part-time career or a second job. On the other hand,
there are no leasing fees drivers pay directly to Uber or Lyft. Instead, payment to these platforms
are on a per-trip basis, encouraging people to drive as much or as little as they want.
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Another important issue motivated by the advent of ride-sharing service is its
impact on public transit usage. Hall et al. (2017) find that entry by Uber resulted
in an increase in public transit use in large cities, but decreased in smaller cities.
Multiple other studies and surveys show that ridership in general has decreased due
to ride-sharing services. Babar and Burtch (2017) look further into the different types
of public transit and find that subway and commuter rail travel increased post-entry
of Uber and Lyft, but city bus travel decreased.
The usual pattern of entry in most U.S. cities has been Uber first, followed by Lyft
a few months later. Sadowsky and Nelson (2017) find that while the entry by Uber
may have had solved the last-mile problem and induced increased usage of public
transport, the entry of Lyft caused price competition between the two ride-sharing
companies. The resulting increase in affordability of ride-sharing decreased public
transport use.6
Li et al. (2016) find that the arrival of Uber caused congestion to decrease in urban
areas across the U.S. They argue that this maybe due to increased vehicle occupancy
and reduced car ownership and even increased substitution of public transit and other
modes of transport instead of cars.7
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Taxi trips
We obtained trip-level NYC yellow taxi data for the time period from January 2009
to December 2017 from the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC).8
6Bliss, L. (2017, October 12) The Ride-Hailing Effect: More Cars, More Trips, More Miles. CityLab.
Retrieved from https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/10/
the-ride-hailing-effect-more-cars-more-trips-more-miles/542592/
7Also see LeBlack, S. (2018, February 25) Studies are increasingly clear: Uber and Lyft congest
cities. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/
technology/ct-uber-lyft-congestion-20180225-story.html
8It is publicly available at the TLC website
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/tlc-trip-record-data.page. The TLC continues to
update this dataset to include taxi trips from the latest months and currently has data till June
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Table 2.1: Description of datasets
Source Period Start Period End Resolution Location Observations
Taxi trips TLC Jan 2009 Dec 2017 Trip Level Lat/Long† 1.6 billion
Uber & Lyft trips TLC Jan 2015 Dec 2017 Trip Level taxi-zone 88 million
Uber & Lyft trips TLC April 2014 Sep 2014 Trip Level Lat/Long 4.5 million
Complaints DoITT Jan 2010 Dec 2017 Incident Level Lat/Long 519,892
The New York Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) uploads all past taxi and FHV trip
data to https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/tlc-trip-record-data.page. Taxi trip data ob-
tained by FiveThirtyEight using a FOIL request to TLC is at https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/
uber-tlc-foil-response. Complaints data without complaint type categorization is publicly available at
https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Social-Services/311-Taxi-Complaints/uppf-z66u. We obtained com-
plaints data categorized by type through a FOIL request from the Department of Information Technology
and Telecommunications (DoITT). †TLC stopped providing latitude and longitude for taxi trips starting
July 1, 2016. Data from that date onwards include taxi-zone only.
This data has been used in the past by several other papers studying taxis and Uber,
some of which we have cited in the literature review section.
Each trip-level observation contains pick-up and drop-off date and time, geo-
graphic location in latitude and longitude of the pick-up and drop-off points, trip
distance, fare, etc. Perhaps due to privacy reasons, the TLC stopped providing lat-
itude and longitude information beginning July 2016. Data since then includes the
pickup and dropoff “taxi-zones” only. Taxi-zones are areas defined by the TLC for
administrative purposes. They are similar to zip codes (Figure 2.2). There are 263
zones across the five boroughs of Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, Bronx, and Staten
Island. All our analyses use trip-level and complaints-level data aggregated to the
zone-week level, i.e. the total number of taxi or Uber/Lyft trips and complaints in a
given week in a given taxi-zone. We elaborate on this in Section 2.4.
2.2.2 Uber and Lyft trips
Trip-level Uber and Lyft data comes from two different sources. The first comes
from the TLC directly. The TLC classifies Uber and Lyft to be “For-Hire Vehicles”
and released trip data of FHV companies for the period starting January 2015 and
continues to update this dataset to include recent months.9
2018.
9Available publicly at the same link cited in the previous footnote. The latest month for which data
is available for taxi and FHV companies as of this writing is June 2018.
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Figure 2.2: taxi-zones by borough
Maps downloaded from TLC website at https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/tlc-trip-record-data.page.
We obtained Uber and Lyft trip data for part of the year 2014 from a different
source. Prior to making FHV trip available on its website, the TLC had provided
FHV trip data to FiveThirtyEight for the period May 2014 to June 2015 (with the
exception of the last three months in 2014) in lieu of a Freedom of Information Law
request.10
Uber entered New York in May 2011 with their premium service “UberBlack”
which has remained small and serves a niche market, in competition with limou-
sine services. “UberX”, their economy line which competes directly with taxis, was
10Available at https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/uber-tlc-foil-response
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: All variables except complaints (Weekly, zone-level)
Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Average Taxi Trip Duration (minutes) 119,589 15.90 9.92 0.05 299.65
Average Taxi Trip Speed (mph) 119,589 16.17 4.57 0.03 79.80
Average Taxi Trip Distance (miles) 52,836 4.50 4.35 0.00 99.22
Average Tip per Trip ($) 52,836 2.24 3.88 0.00 269.74
No. of Boro Pickups (000s) 119,589 0.49 1.87 0.00 21.70
No. of Rodent Sightings 73,886 3.22 3.24 1.00 310.00
No of Taxi Pickups (000s) 119,589 11.60 25.91 0.00 172.69
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 45,451 6.09 9.03 0.00 68.86
The unit of observation is taxi-zone-week. Complaints data cover the period starting January
2010 and ending December 2017. Taxi trip data start at January 2009 and end at December
2017. Uber and Lyft trip data cover the 6 months in 2014 from April to September and all
of 2015, 2016 and 2017. Average trip duration is computed using pickup and dropoff times
available in the taxi trips data.
launched in July 2012. Lyft entered later in August 2014. In May 2014, the first
month for which we have data for Uber, it had roughly half a million trips on its
platform. In contrast, in November 2017, the last month for which we have data
for all days,11 there were more than 14 million trips (Figure 2.1). We thus believe
the early period for which data is missing, the period from July 2012 to April 2014,
is a relatively less crucial period and the lack of this period’s data likely does not
significantly affect our ability to determine the impact of ride-sharing services on taxi
service quality. Furthermore, in the early days after Uber’s launch, it was not as
well-known and the taxi drivers might not have felt a substantial threat from Uber
at that early stage. As a result, any behavioral response from taxi drivers was likely
not large.
2.2.3 Complaints against taxi drivers
Similar to 9-1-1, some cities in the U.S. have a 3-1-1 service residents can use to
report a variety of issues such as dirty sidewalks, damaged trees etc. Taxi riders
also use this number to report any issues they face when dealing with taxi drivers.
The Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications (DoITT) of NYC
makes data on all such reports through 3-1-1 publicly available on the NYC OpenData
11We have Uber and Lyft data for the first one week of December 2017 only.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: All complaints (Weekly, zone-level)
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
AC, Heat, Radio Refused 0.00† 0.01 0 1
Broken or Missing Equipment 0.03 0.19 0 4
Cellphone Use 0.05 0.25 0 13
Combined Pickups 0.00 0.02 0 1
Denied Request 0.08 0.33 0 17
Discourteous 0.20 0.58 0 35
Dropoff Refused 0.00 0.05 0 2
Fare Tip 0.29 0.74 0 14
Insurance Request 0.00 0.04 0 2
Insurance Request, Non-Passengers 0.03 0.17 0 4
Insurance Request, Passengers 0.01 0.11 0 3
License Not Displayed 0.02 0.15 0 6
Lost Item 2.25 4.49 0 55
Pickup Refused 0.31 0.79 0 26
Route 0.11 0.37 0 6
Delay or No Show 0.00 0.03 0 2
Unauth. Pickup Location 0.02 0.42 0 62
Unauth. Vehicle Operation 0.00 0.00 0 1
Unclean or Odor 0.01 0.09 0 3
Unsafe Driving, Non-Passengers 0.32 1.32 0 105
Unsafe Driving, Passengers 0.10 0.36 0 5
†All mean values 0.00 are truncated to maintain consistent format. The
unit of observation is taxi-zone-week. Complaints data cover the period
starting January 2010 and ending December 2017. Complaints in alpha-
betical order. N = 106,082 for each complaint type.
website.12. It provides data on each individual complaint made by passengers and non-
passengers against taxi drivers and/or taxi companies, such as incident data, latitude
and longitude of incident etc. However, this publicly available data on complaints do
not contain information about the complaint type, i.e. whether the complaint was
about rude behavior by the driver or a fare overcharge and so on.
We obtained this same dataset of complaints, but along with categorization of
these complaints by type, through a FOIL request to DoITT. Specifically, this dataset
two descriptors on each incident indicating the type of complaint (e.g. whether it was
regarding unsafe driving or the route taken by the driver). The TLC categorizes the
incidents into 21 types. We have retained the names of the original incident types as
used by TLC. The dataset contains complaints for the period from January 2010 to
December 2017.
The complaints dataset contain a total of 561,236 reports. Of these, 528,701
12https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Social-Services/311-Taxi-Complaints/uppf-z66u We
perform a falsification test using rodent sightings reported through 3-1-1 and that data comes from
the NYC OpenData site also.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics: Main Variables (Weekly, city-level)
count mean sd min max
Unsafe Driving, Non-Passengers 424 64.78 57.36 0.00 328.00
Pickup Refused 424 62.63 41.88 0.00 229.00
Fare Tip 424 59.62 35.04 0.00 222.00
Discourteous 424 41.76 24.06 0.00 104.00
Route 424 22.46 13.17 0.00 58.00
Unsafe Driving, Passengers 424 20.55 12.01 0.00 52.00
No. of Taxi trips (000s) 477 2937.52 572.83 244.55 4346.46
No. of Uber and Lyft trips (000s) 185 1728.58 893.13 0.00 3630.07
The unit of observation is city-week. Complaints ordered by weekly average, largest
first. Fare Tip (total) is the sum of three separate complaint types: fare tip, fare
tip credit card and fare tip receipt. Complaints data cover the 424 weeks starting
January 2010 and ending December 2017. Taxi trip data cover 477 weeks start at
January 2009 and end at December 2017. Uber and Lyft trip data cover 26 weeks
in 2014 from April to September and another 159 weeks from 2015 to 2017.
(94.2%) have a latitude and longitude of the incident location. There are about 5,000
complaints against limousine drivers which we have dropped since that is not our
focus. After we filter out compliments to drivers by taxi riders, we are left with
519,892 observations. Notice in Table 2.3 the category “Lost Items”. This comprises
reports regarding lost items and are obviously not complaints against drivers and
hence we do not use it in our main analysis. However, lost items provide the basis
for one of our falsification tests in Section ??. While the TLC classifies tip-related
complaints into three different types – fare-tip, fare-tip credit card and fare-tip receipt,
for the purpose of our analyses we combined these three into one category “Fare-Tip”
given the similarity of these types of incidents.
Table 2.1 provides the description of all datasets we use including source, time
span, resolution, location information type and number of observations. Table 2.2
provides summary statistics for all variables except complaints at the zone-week level.
Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics for all complaint types. Table 2.4 reports
statistics for the main variables of interest at the city level, i.e. for the whole of New
York City.
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Figure 2.3: Complaints before and after Uber entry
Taxi and Uber trip data was aggregated to generate monthly data for this figure. All complaints
are normalized to be per million taxi trips. Red line denote Uber entry in July 2012.
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Figure 2.4: Scatterplot of complaints and Uber/Lyft trips
Taxi, Uber and Lyft trip data was aggregated to generate monthly data for this figure. All com-
plaints are normalized to be per million taxi trips.
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2.2.4 Trends in complaints
There are several interesting patterns in the data. First, we plot the normalized
number of high-frequency complaints in New York before and after the entry of Uber
in Figure 2.3. The vertical axis of each panel represents the number of complaints per
million taxi trips and the vertical red line marks the entry of Uber. The complaints are
aggregated at the monthly level for this figure. Monthly unsafe driving complaints
by non-passengers in New York was around 20 per million taxi trips before Uber,
but experienced a steady upward trend since then. Unsafe driving complaints by
passengers did not grow as fast (panel (b)). Panel (c) illustrates complaints regarding
pick-up refusals. While the trend is relatively flat, notice the large jump slightly after
entry by Lyft in August 2014. Both complaints pertaining to discourteous behavior
and tips to drivers fell before Uber entered but has crept up slightly since entry (panels
(d) and (e)). Route complaints rose post-Uber entry although it has gone back down
more recently. Since these charts show normalized complaints, these spikes cannot
be attributed to changes in taxi trips.
Figure 2.4 shows scatter plots with the normalized frequency of different com-
plaints on the vertical axes and the number of Uber and Lyft trips on the horizontal
axes. Complaints other than those regarding refused pick-ups and route complaints
are positively correlated with the number of Uber and Lyft trips. Pick-up refusal com-
plaints went up rapidly with the initial increase in competition from Uber but then
gradually fell after penetration by ride-sharing services reached a threshold. There is
no clear pattern for route complaints.
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2.3 Identification
2.3.1 Complaints as a measure of service quality
Using complaints to measure (the lack of) service quality is not without caveats.
Complaints tell the reporters’ one-sided story. Taxi drivers cannot explain their be-
havior in their defense against complaints. For instance, it may be that the driver was
genuinely not at fault and the passenger was either lying13 or had unreasonable expec-
tations. Examples of unreasonable expectations is observed in the complaints data.
Some riders complain that the driver did not have a toll tag which allows for easy
access through toll highways and bridges, resulting in longer trips; however, drivers
are not required to have toll tags by the taxi authority and hence such complaints
are not an indication of low service quality. Similarly, despite years of experience and
familiarity with the city and access to a GPS, some honest drivers do get lost and
end up taking a longer route. Naturally, some riders become suspicious and feel such
incidents are an attempt to overcharge them.
We also cannot rule out the possibility of fake complaints by other taxi drivers
or even Uber drivers for reasons of enmity or otherwise. In addition, what occurs
after the complaint is made is usually not recorded by taxi authorities except what
disciplinary action was taken, if any. We dealt with some of these issues with appro-
priate data cleaning, such as dropping complaints whose descriptions indicate that
the passenger complained about driver not having a toll-tag. Regarding issues such
as lying and unreasonable expectations, this will cause problems with unbiased es-
timation only if the proportion of passengers who tend to lie or have unreasonable
expectations change after the entry of Uber and Lyft. As for incidents such as when
the passenger incorrectly perceives to be overcharged, there is no a priori reason to
believe that the propensity to make such mistakes in judgment should change after
13Motives for lying is not important here; one reason may be that the passenger and driver had an
argument and the former is trying to “get back” at the latter.
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entry of ride-sharing services.
2.3.2 Alternative possibilities
There are several possible reasons why the number of Uber and Lyft trips and com-
plaints may be correlated. First, there may be a pure competition effect. Uber and
Lyft cars tend to be nicer on average and drivers on these platforms get rated by
the passengers immediately after the trip. An average rating below a threshold set
by these ride-sharing companies leads to driver deactivation and hence generates a
strong incentive to provide good service. Once taxi riders use these alternative ser-
vices, they may not go back to taxis. To prevent this, taxi drivers may be trying
harder to please passengers relative to the period before Uber and Lyft entry, which
may then lead to decrease in complaints. However, this is unlikely. Given the almost
zero probability of a satisfied passenger using that same taxi driver in the future, any
good service is likely to improve the image of taxis in the mind of the passenger in
general rather than that specific taxi driver specifically. So better quality service by
this specific driver may prevent this passenger from switching to Uber and contribute
to increased (or at least not decreased) usage of taxis in general, but other taxi drivers
will be the beneficiaries. Anticipating this, we do not expect taxi drivers to exert ad-
ditional effort to provide higher service quality. In other words, there are positive
externalities to providing quality service and hence we expect under-provision.
An important related issue is that consumer expectations may have gone up.
As we just mentioned above, Uber cars and/or drivers are nicer, thus changing the
benchmark taxi passengers are using to rate taxi drivers in their minds. They are more
unhappy with taxi quality now that they have access to higher-quality Uber rides,
regardless of actual changes in taxi service quality. The problem with this story is
this should not affect non-passenger complaints. But non-passenger complaints did
increase substantially as we saw in Figure 2.3.
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The increase in market shares of Uber and Lyft may have coincided with an in-
crease in complaints because of more lax enforcement of rules by the TLC against
taxi drivers who have violated rules and/or caused riders to be dissatisfied. Unfor-
tunately, we do not observe variations in enforcement intensity directly in the data.
However, actions by the TLC to improve the market share of taxi drivers in the face
of competition from Uber and Lyft, such as the introduction of an app to hail taxis,
indicate that it would be unreasonable to expect the TLC to become more lenient
with bad service quality by drivers instead of becoming stricter.
Complaints and ride-sharing penetration may also be correlated because of a rapid
rise in smartphone adoption during our sample period. Internet connectivity in smart-
phones may have made it easier for an unhappy passenger or non-passenger to look
up the contact information of the appropriate agency to make complaints. However,
a sticker inside taxis near passenger seats with instructions to call 3-1-1 regarding
complaints has been in taxis since before the arrival of smartphones, eliminating any
concern that passengers had a harder time figuring out how to make a complaint
prior to having smartphones. Even if this was not to be true, smartphones are still
unlikely to have driven changes in complaints because in that case all complaints
should have gone up, not just a subset. There is no a priori reason to believe that
a decrease in difficulty to lodge a complaint should be biased towards certain types
of complaint but not others. As we have seen in Figure 2.3, we do find that not all
types of complaints have gone up. In particular, pickup refusal complaints had not
experienced an upward trend until late 2014 even though smartphones had become
widespread a considerable period before that.
Perhaps it is a change in taxi driver composition that caused taxi service quality
to change. The “good” taxi drivers stopped driving taxis and moved somewhere else,
either to drive for Uber or to some other career. On top of that, the drivers newly
joining taxis are the “bad” ones. The reverse may also be true—the bad drivers left
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taxis and new ones joining taxis are better than the outgoing ones.14 Why either
case may occur is not important as long it was caused by the entry of Uber and Lyft.
Rather what is important is understanding the implication of such a change in driver
composition. In such a case, taxi service quality can go down because of changes
in the fraction of good vs. bad drivers and not because the drivers who remained
with taxis before and after Uber entry are providing worse service. Changes in driver
composition is likely to be time-varying and perhaps also varying partly across taxi-
zones. Using driver-level data, we investigate this particular possibility in Section
2.6.
Changes in passenger composition can also lead to changes in complaints without
any corresponding change in actual taxi service quality. The fraction of “whiners”
may have increased, leading to more complaints even if drivers are still providing the
same quality of service. If such a change in passenger composition is caused by the
arrival of Uber and Lyft, we need to factor it into our estimation.
The existing literature on the various effects of Uber suggests that Uber has also
had impact on congestion. But congestion itself can affect the number of complaints
against taxi drivers. Taxi drivers stuck in increasingly congested roads may decide to
drive more aggressively, say by jumping red lights. They may refuse fares that will
take them to congested parts of the city. We use average trip duration to measure
and control for congestion.
The media and prior papers on Uber also extensively document the loss in market
share of taxi drivers due to competition from these platforms. Everything else con-
stant, fewer trips should generate fewer opportunities for passengers to be unhappy
about something and hence should lead to fewer complaints. To prevent volume of
14There is a plausible reason for good drivers leaving taxis for Uber and Lyft instead of the bad ones.
Given the more stringent rating systems on ride-sharing platforms as we have discussed earlier, the
good taxi drivers have a better chance of survival on those platforms vis-a-vis the bad drivers who
would prefer to keep driving taxis where they are less likely to be penalized for poor quality
service. If Uber does provide better income opportunities, the first set of taxi drivers to leave
would in that case be the good ones. Thanks to Dmitry Shishkin for pointing this out.
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taxi rides to confound the relationship between competition from Uber and Lyft and
the number of complaints, we control for the number of taxi trips.
Moroever, it is possible that the length of trips has changed post-Uber entry. For
instance, since Uber drivers do not have the opportunity to reject less profitable short
rides unlike taxi drivers, riders may have switched to Uber for these short rides more
than they have for longer rides. On the other hand, longer trips provide more scope
for interaction between driver and rider and hence can potentially generate more
complaints. Thus leaving out taxi trip distance can cause omitted variables bias. We
take this into account by average trip distance as a control variable.
It may be argued that an increase in complaints may be due to complaints by
ride-sharing drivers who are likely to come across and observe taxicab drivers’ behav-
ior. In other words, more monitoring agents could have naturally led to more reports.
However, we think that this behavior seems unlikely in reality because anyone report-
ing an incident must provide a detailed description of the incident which involves a
substantial opportunity cost for Uber and Lyft drivers in the form of lost income.
In August 2013, the TLC started operating Boro Taxis.15 These Boro taxis can
drop off passengers anywhere and can also pick up passengers anywhere in the outer
boroughs (all five boroughs except Manhattan). However, they are not allowed to pick
up passengers in the “yellow zone” of Manhattan which is south of East 96th and West
110th Streets. Any observed correlation between Uber/Lyft trips and complaints
against yellow taxi drivers may actually be due to the introduction of these Boro
taxis and not the arrival of ride-sharing services, at least in the case of complaints in
the outer boroughs. We use Boro taxi trips to control for this.
An additional complication arises due to potential simultaneity between taxi com-
plaints and ride-sharing and taxi trips. It is plausible that a rise in taxi complaints
reflects dissatisfaction by taxi passengers who then increasingly switch to Uber lead-
15Sometimes referred to as “Green” taxis because of their green color, in contrast to regular yellow
cabs.
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ing to higher numbers of Uber and Lyft trips and a lower number of taxi trips. If
this is true, changes in complaints can cause changes in number of Uber and Lyft
trips and taxi trips. In Section 2.4.3, we elaborate on how we address this potential
reverse causality using instrumental variables.
2.4 Estimation
2.4.1 Panel data construction
We combine the trip-level taxi data and Uber/Lyft data with the incident-level com-
plaints data into a panel structure where taxi-zones l = 1, 2, ..., 263 constitute the
cross-section dimension. Since both trips and complaints are at the trip/incident
level with date and time for each incident or trip available, we have the ability to use
month, week, day or even hour to use as the time dimension. Since complaints are
not very frequent, e.g. only 20 complaints of a specific type such as pickup refusal
in the whole of New York City in an entire month, aggregating at a high-resolution
such as hour or day would lead to excessive zeros, causing problems with estimation.
On the other hand, aggregating at a low-resolution such as month and year would
not allow for a variety of time fixed effects that we would like to use to control for
time-varying factors. Hence, we chose to aggregate trips and complaints at the week
level which provides a balance in resolution. We assigned the first seven days of each
year to “Week 1”, the next seven to “Week 2” and so on. As a result, we have data
for 53 weeks for each of 9 years, 2009 to 2017, for a total of 477 weeks. Note however
that due to the fact that we have data on Uber and Lyfts for the years 2014 to 2017
only, not all of the sample will be used in our regressions.
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2.4.2 Specification
We estimate a panel regression using the following specification:
Complaintsit = β0 + β1 ULit + β2 Taxiit + δXit + Σi×q + εit (2.1)
The dependent variable Complaintslt captures the total number of complaints of a
specific type (e.g. route complaint) for taxi-zone i in week t. ULit and Taxiit are the
numbers of Uber and Lyft pickups and taxi pickups respectively. While we have data
on both taxi pick-ups and drop-offs,16 we control for taxi pick-ups but not drop-offs
to prevent multicollinearity since the two variables are highly correlated. We chose
pickups instead of dropoffs because taxicab drivers are more in control of where they
want to pick up passengers relative to where they drop them off. Xit is the vector
of all control variables except taxi trips. This comprises average taxi trip duration,
average taxi trip distance, number of Boro taxi trips, and average tip amount per
taxi trip.
We use zone-quarter fixed effects denoted by Σi×q which allows for shocks that
vary across time and space. The zone-by-quarter fixed effect terms can be expressed




q=1 θiqIiIq where Ii and Iq are indicator
functions taking on a value of one for zone i and quarter q, otherwise zero. The
fourteen quarters are the sum of two quarters in 2014 and four each from 2015 to
2017 that we have Uber and Lyft data for. We include the fixed effects to address the
concerns regarding identification due to several confounding factors such as changes
in smartphone adoption rates, passenger expectations about quality, intensity of en-
forcement of rules and passenger composition. These factors vary across different
parts of the city and also over time (e.g. years), but less likely over a shorter time
horizon like quarters.
16Recall that we do not have Uber and Lyft drop-off data for most of the sample period
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Recall from our discussion in the previous section that we suspect simultaneity
in the determination of the relationships between Complaints, UL and Taxi. To
address this, we use instrumental variables.
2.4.3 Bartik shift-shares as IV
Our two instruments are shift-shares (Bartik, 1991), which have been used in the
empirical literature in international trade, development economics, labor economics
and urban economics.17 The idea of Bartik shift-shares is to generate shares of some
activity for each object of study (e.g. labor market, geographic region, industry) prior
to a shock which are then multiplied by the total of that same activity after the shock
to generate predicted shares.
In a typical labor market setting, the shock may be immigration of foreign labor
and the objects of study are several industries exposed to that shock. The percentage
of workers in each industry are the shares and are used to generate predicted industry
shares by multiplying with the total industry employment post-immigration. In our
case, the shock is the entry of Uber and Lyft and the objects of study are the taxi-
zones. Fortunately we have taxi trip data from 2009, prior to the entry of these two
platforms. We compute the Bartik shift-shares as follows.
We compute the share of trips for each taxi-zone i in week t during the years






where σitk denotes the share of trips in taxi-zone i in week t of year k = 2009, 2010, 2011.
17For a more detailed discussion on shift-share instruments, we refer to two recent papers, Jaeger et
al. (2018) and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018). One good example of implementation of
shift-shares instruments is David et al. (2013)




taxi trips in zone i in week t of year k
total taxi trips in NYC in week t of year k
(2.3)
The reason for taking the average over three years is to smooth out the potential
impact of idiosyncratic shocks in a given year. Then, the two instruments are the
predicted number of Uber and Lyft trips in taxi-zone i in week t in each of the years
post-entry, i.e. y = 2014, .., 2017:
z1,it = σit × ULt (2.4)
and the predicted number of taxi trips in taxi-zone i in week t:
z2,it = σit × Taxit (2.5)
There is reason to believe that these predicted trips z1,it and z2,it are correlated with
the actual trips ULit and Taxiit respectively. Uber and Lyft drivers, either through
prior experience (perhaps as a former taxi driver) or through trial and error, will
figure out which locations to roam around to maximize the probability of picking up
a passenger. Unless there is a significant change in economic activity across taxi-
zones between the early years in our sample and the later years, zones that had a
large fraction of taxi trips in 2011 will also tend to be the places which will generate
a large fraction of Uber and Lyft trips in 2015. Very similar logic applies for the
predicted taxi trips.
Our argument that Bartik shift-shares satisfy the assumption of exogeneity is as
follows. These shift-shares are composed of two terms – total Uber/Lyft trips and
total taxi trips in New York City during our sample period and intensity of taxi
activity several years prior to the start of our sample period. Neither of these terms
should be correlated with complaints. City-wide trips are determined by factors that
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affect commuting activity in all 263 zones only a small subset of which will also affect
the complaints of a single zone. Shares of trips in a single zone back in 2011 cannot
reasonably be expected to be correlated with complaints in 2014.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Full sample
We report the OLS estimates for high-frequency complaints using the full sample in
Table 2.5. All six categories of complaints against taxi drivers have gone up since
the arrival of Uber and Lyft. The relationships are all statistically significant at
5% or less. The coefficient for complaints by non-passengers pertaining to unsafe
driving is 0.053 which indicates a rise in weekly complaints of 0.053 at the zone-level
for every 1000 Uber and Lyft trips. The average number of weekly Uber and Lyft
trips in a typical taxi-zone during the sample period (i.e. between 2014 and 2017)
was roughly 6000 (Table 2.2). This led to an increase in unsafe driving complaints
by non-passengers by 6 × 0.053 = 0.318 complaints per week in such a taxi-zone.
An uniform increase of Uber and Lyft trips from 0 to 6,000 in all 263 taxi-zones
would lead to 0.318 × 263 = 84 additional complaints across the city in a week.
City-level coefficients reflecting the increase in complaints at the mean for the other
types of complaints can be computed in a similar manner. While the magnitude of
the rise in these other types of complaints are much smaller in comparison to that
of unsafe driving complaints by non-passengers, they are nevertheless not negligible
when considered at the city level.
Table 2.6 presents the results for the less frequent complaints. None of the esti-
mates are statistically significant. We note here that we did not split the categories
of complaints into those that increased due to competition from ride-sharing services
and those did not. Rather, we split them, as mentioned before, by frequency of oc-
currences. However, we are not surprised that the less frequent complaints were not
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Table 2.5: High-frequency complaints, OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unsafe np pick ref fare tip discourteous route unsafe p
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.053∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No of Taxi Pickups (000s) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Boro Pickups (000s) -0.003 0.014∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.000 0.003∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. Taxi Trip Duration (minutes) 0.000† 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Taxi Trip Distance (miles) 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg.Tip per Trip 0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.102 0.040∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.015) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.015 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.004
Increase in complaints at city-level 84 6 8 5 5 3
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the week level. All columns include zone-quarter fixed effects
and N = 45, 752 in each column. Period of analysis begins at April 2014 and ends December 2017 with missing
values for the months of October to December 2014. †All coefficients appearing as 0.000 are truncated to maintain
consistent format. Coefficients capturing increase in complaints at city-level are rounded to whole numbers.
Table 2.6: Low-frequency complaints, OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
den req cellphone broken equip unauth pickup unclean
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
No of Taxi Pickups (000s) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Boro Pickups (000s) 0.003∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Average Taxi Trip Duration (minutes) 0.000† 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Taxi Trip Distance (miles) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Tip per Trip -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.015∗∗ 0.008 0.011∗∗ 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Increase in complaints at city-level 2 0 0 5 0
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the week level. All columns include
zone-quarter fixed effects and N = 45, 752 in each column. Period of analysis begins at April 2014 and ends
December 2017 with missing values for the months of October to December 2014. †All coefficients appearing
as 0.000 are truncated to maintain consistent format. Coefficients capturing increase in complaints at city-
level are rounded to whole numbers.
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Table 2.7: High-frequency complaints, IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unsafe np pick ref fare tip discourteous route unsafe p
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.069∗∗ -0.002 0.005∗ 0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.032) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of Taxi Pickups (000s) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of Boro Pickups (000s) -0.006 0.015∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.000 0.003∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. Taxi Trip Duration (minutes) -0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Taxi Trip Distance (miles) 0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Avg. Tip per Trip 0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Centered R2 0.028 0.015 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.004
p-value for endogeneity test 0.386 0.001 0.747 0.531 0.072 0.154
Change in complaints at city-level‡ 109 -3 8 5 2 0
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the week level. All columns include zone-quarter fixed
effects. N = 45, 024 in each column. Period of analysis begins at April 2014 and ends June 2016 with missing
values for the months of October to December 2014. Coefficients capturing increase in complaints at city-level
are rounded to whole numbers. †All coefficients appearing as 0.000 are truncated to maintain consistent format.
‡See explanation of city-level coefficients in the discussion section.
The p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap LM test for under-identification is 0.00 and thus the null hypothesis of under-
identification is rejected. The F statistic for the Kleibergen-Paap Wald test for weak identification is 191.966 and
the null hypothesis of weak instruments is rejected. The endogeneity test is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman version.
The null hypothesis of exogeneity of taxi trips and Uber and Lyft trips is rejected at the 5% significance level for
the case of pickup refusal complaints only. First-stage regression results and related diagnostics are reported in
the Appendix.
significantly affected. The high-frequency complaints are regarding behavior that usu-
ally provokes a strong response by passengers, such as driving recklessly, refusing to
take the rider where he/she wants to go, rude behavior etc.. The low-frequency com-
plaints on the other hand may bother the passenger but may not frustrate him/her
enough to make a phone call to complain against the driver. For example, an unclean
car or cellphone usage by the driver may not be worth the effort for many passengers
to call 311 and report. From the regression results, it seems that this has continued to
be the case after the arrival of Uber and Lyft. Regression results using IV estimation
and for various sub-samples19 do not bring up anything different and hence from here
on we will present results for high-frequency complaints only.
In Table 2.7, we show the estimates from the 2SLS regressions on high-frequency
complaints. The interesting contrast between the OLS and IV results is that the size
19Results available upon request.
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Table 2.8: IV estimates, by year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unsafe np pick ref fare tip discourteous route unsafe p
All years (N=45024)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.069∗∗ -0.002 0.005∗ 0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.032) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2014-2015 (N=19309)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.037∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
2016-2017 (N=25715)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.063∗∗ -0.001 0.006∗∗ 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.029) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the week level. All columns include zone-quarter fixed
effects and control variables Boro Pickups, Avg. Taxi Trip Duration, Avg. Taxi Trip Distance and Avg. Tip
per Trip.
of the coefficient for non-passenger unsafe driving complaints increased but the rest
of the coefficients decreased. Further, unsafe driving complaints by non-passengers
is also the only quality dimension that remains statistically significant at 5% or less
once we control for potential reverse causality. We elaborate on this in light of our
discussion on regressions on samples split by years and boroughs in the next two
sections.
Among the control variables, yellow taxi trips and boro taxi trips have a statis-
tically significant and positive relationship with complaints in most cases. But the
other covariates have little or no explanatory power except in regard to pickup refusal
complaints.
2.5.2 Years
It is likely that the penetration of Uber and Lyft was not uniform across years,
boroughs and even taxi-zones. Further, some taxi-zones are busier than others and
generate a disproportionate fraction of taxi activity and consequently complaints.
Thus we analyze the relationship between competition from ride-sharing services and
taxi driver behavior by splitting the samples in several different ways.
First, we look at the impact across time. We expect competition from Uber and
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Lyft to have the greatest impact on taxi drivers’ behavior in the early years after their
entries. It would be unreasonable to expect that the shock to the transportation
sector in NYC in the form of new ride providers (Uber and Lyft) will continue to
have impact beyond a certain period. After a period of adjustment, whether that is
through changes in driver or rider composition or changes in rider expectations or
enforcement of rules by the TLC on taxi drivers, one should expect the impact to
diminish after a while.
Table 2.8 presents the results split into the sample covering the first two and later
two years. We also provide the estimates for the entire sample period for comparison
purposes. The impact of Uber and Lyft was substantially larger in the first two years
of our sample relative to the latter two years. Recall from Figure 2.1 that though
Uber started operating UberX in New York City in July 2012, penetration was slow
in 2012 and 2013 and rapidly increased in 2014 onward. While five of the complaint
categories show a statistically significant increase in 2014 and 2015, only one remains
to be significant in 2016 and 2017. Furthermore, the size of the coefficients are much
smaller for five of the types of complaints in the latter period relative to the earlier
period. These results also imply that the results for the entire time period between
2014 and 2017 are misleading to an extent because one fails to detect the rise in
complaints in the earlier period by looking at the results for the entire period.
It is important to reiterate that all our regressions include zone-quarter fixed
effects and hence variation in coefficients across years cannot be the result of time
trends and other unobserved changes over the years, including changes that were
heterogeneous across taxi-zones.
2.5.3 Boroughs
Recall that New York City is divided into five boroughs – Manhattan, Queens, Brook-
lyn, Bronx and Staten Island. Since Boro taxis introduced by TLC in 2013 were
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Table 2.9: IV estimates, Manhattan vs. Other Boroughs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unsafe np pick ref fare tip discourteous route unsafe p
New York City (N=19309)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.037∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
No. of Boro Pickups (000s) 0.012 -0.004 0.001 0.009 -0.007∗∗ 0.004
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Manhattan (N=5188)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.038∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009)
No. of Boro Pickups (000s) 0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.012∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.010) (0.021) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
All other boroughs (N=14121)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) -0.047 0.161∗∗ -0.114 0.004 -0.038 -0.109∗
(0.146) (0.065) (0.096) (0.077) (0.072) (0.056)
No. of Boro Pickups (000s) 0.031 -0.011 0.029 0.013 0.010 0.022∗
(0.029) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the week level. All columns include zone-quarter fixed
effects and control variables Boro Pickups, Avg. Taxi Trip Duration, Avg. Taxi Trip Distance and Avg. Tip
per Trip. Period of analysis begins at April 2014 and ends December 2015 with missing values for the months of
October to December 2014.
restricted to picking up passengers from all boroughs except Manhattan, we can find
out whether the impact of competition from Boro taxis interacted with the competi-
tion from Uber and Lyft in unexpected ways. Moreoever, Manhattan contains most
of the busiest taxi-zones20 and is hence likely to drive most of the results in aggregate.
In Table 2.9, we present results separately for Manhattan and for all other boroughs.
We also provide the estimates for the whole city for comparison purposes.
One immediately notices how similar the coefficients are for Manhattan and for
the whole of New York City. The reason for driver behavior in Manhattan to mirror
that of the overall city is perhaps due to the fact that most taxi activity takes place
in Manhattan. This gives rise to the the over-weighting of the role of the coefficients
for Manhattan in determining the coefficients for the whole city.
2.5.4 Busy taxi-zones
While Manhattan dominates in taxi activity, other boroughs do contain some busy
zones. For instance, both JFK and LaGuardia airports are in Queens. We plot the
20The top ten busiest taxi-zones are all in Manhattan.
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Figure 2.5: Cumulative sum of pick-ups (black) and complaints (red)
distributions of taxi pick-ups and complaints across taxi-zones in Figure 2.5. It shows
that both distributions are highly skewed – there are 14 zones that have no complaints
and 53% of zones account for 95% of all complaints. This implies that the results
may vary depending on whether all taxi-zones are used for analysis or a subset of
taxi-zones.
Table 2.10 provides the summary statistics for the taxi-zones that are in the top
5% in terms of taxi trips. Contrast this with the summary statistics for all zones in
Table 2.2 in Section 2.2. The mean value of the number of Uber and Lyft pickups in
a given zone increases from 6.09 to 23.35 (in thousands of trips) when we focus on the
core zones. The number of taxi pickups are more than eight times in the core zones.
We present 2SLS regression estimates for high-frequency complaints on progres-
sively smaller samples containing the taxi-zones that contained the highest number
of trips in Table 2.11. It shows results on samples containing zones in the top 25%,
top 15% and top 5% in terms of taxi trips respectively. The top two rows show the
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Table 2.10: Summary Statistics – Busiest Taxi-Zones (Weekly, zone-level)
Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
All zones
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 45,451 6.09 9.03 0.00 68.86
No of Taxi Pickups (000s) 119,589 11.60 25.91 0.00 172.69
Top 5% zones
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 2,545 23.35 13.82 0.20 68.86
No of Taxi Pickups (000s) 6,675 93.08 22.20 4.65 172.69
The unit of observation is taxi-zone-week. Complaints data cover the period starting Jan-
uary 2010 and ending December 2017. Taxi trip data start at January 2009 and end at
December 2017. Uber and Lyft trip data cover the 6 months in 2014 from April to Septem-
ber and all of 2015, 2016 and 2017.
Table 2.11: IV estimates – sub-sample of busiest taxi-zones
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unsafe np pick ref fare tip discourteous route unsafe p
All taxi-zones (N=19309)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.037∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
Top 25% taxi-zones (N=5029)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.033∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
Top 15% taxi-zones (N=3092)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.035∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.030∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010)
Top 5% taxi-zones (N=1083)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.019 0.167∗∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.016
(0.028) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015)
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the week level. All columns include zone-quarter fixed
effects and control variables Boro Pickups, Avg. Taxi Trip Duration, Avg. Taxi Trip Distance and Avg. Tip
per Trip. Period of analysis begins at April 2014 and ends December 2015 with missing values for the months
of October to December 2014.
results for all zones for contrast.
There is evidence that complaints about pickup refusals, discourteous behavior
and route taken by the driver increase after the entry of ride-sharing services, regard-
less of which taxi-zones we focus on. Indeed, the impact is more pronounced in the
busiest taxi-zones; 0.143 increases to 0.176 in the case of pickup refusals and 0.036
more than doubles to 0.081 in the case of rude behavior.
Unsafe driving as reported by non-passengers do not have a statistically significant
relationship with Uber and Lyft trips when focusing on the top 5% taxi-zones only.
There is a sizable drop in the size of the coefficient from around 0.037 to 0.019.
It is possibly because it is harder to drive recklessly in more congested areas. It
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is interesting to note the contrast between the two sources of complaints regarding
unsafe driving – from passengers and non-passengers. While the former seems to
have not gone up except in the busiest areas, the reverse is true for complaints from
non-passengers. This may be due to the differences in the taxi-zones. Taxi drivers
spend most of their time in quieter taxi-zones driving a vacant car back to busy zones
after dropping off passengers in the former zones. As a result, any unsafe driving in
those less busy zones are likely to be reported by non-passengers. Moreover, given
the loss in market share due to Uber and Lyft, they may have become increasingly
desperate to get back to busy pickup spots and as a result engaged in reckless driving.
Contrast that with driving behavior within busy zones where the likelihood of the
taxi being being not vacant is higher. So unsafe driving is reported by passengers at
a greater frequency in these busy taxi-zones.
2.5.5 Other specifications
Given the large sample size and ease of interpretation of coefficients generated through
OLS and 2SLS estimation, our preferred specification are those two. However, since
complaints data is count data, it is appropriate to see how the results may vary using
count data models. We present results using Poisson and Negative Binomial MLE in
Table 2.12.
All coefficients in Table 2.12 are presented in the form of incident-rate ratios. A
coefficient larger than 1 indicates a positive relationship between the independent and
dependent variables. The absolute difference between 1 and the coefficient captures
the percentage change in the number of complaints due to a change in the independent
variable by one unit. For instance, in the case of route complaints, the coefficient of
1.012 indicates a 1.2% increase in the number of complaints due to an additional 1000
Uber and Lyft trips.
We make several observations in comparing these results with those using OLS in
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Table 2.12: Poisson and Negative Binomial MLE estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unsafe np pick ref fare tip discourteous route unsafe p
Poisson
Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 1.015∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 31238 28205 34069 30056 24796 19456
Log-Likelihood -22740.900 -17517.137 -18851.077 -14594.396 -10004.598 -8392.087
Negative Binomial
Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 1.011∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗ 1.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 31238 28205 34069 30056 24796 19456
Log-Likelihood -22066.577 -17407.446 -18809.841 -14580.697 -9989.189 -8383.695
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the week level. All columns include zone-quarter fixed
effects and control variables Boro Pickups, Avg. Taxi Trip Duration, Avg. Taxi Trip Distance and Avg. Tip per
Trip. All coefficients are presented in the form of incident-rate ratios. See the text for interpretation of these
ratios. Period of analysis begins at April 2014 and ends December 2017 with missing values for the months of
October to December 2014.
Table 2.13: OLS estimates using daily and monthly data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unsafe np pick ref fare tip discourteous route unsafe p
Daily data, 2014-2017, N=230614
Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.082 0.009 0.023∗∗ 0.005 0.011∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.052) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Daily data, 2014-2015, N=101427
Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.021 0.184∗∗∗ 0.015 0.003 -0.022 -0.010
(0.052) (0.048) (0.036) (0.028) (0.024) (0.044)
Daily data, 2016-2017, N=129187
Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.090 0.009 0.023∗ 0.007 0.015∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.063) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Monthly data, 2014-2017, N=9754
Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Monthly data, 2014-2015, N=4226
Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Monthly data, 2016-2017, N=5528
Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) 0.040∗∗∗ -0.005∗ 0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.014) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the daily level in the top three sets of results and at
the monthly level in the bottom three sets of results. Daily-level regressions include zone-month fixed effects
and monthly-level regressions include zone-year fixed effects. All estimations include control variables Boro
Pickups, Avg. Taxi Trip Duration, Avg. Taxi Trip Distance and Avg. Tip per Trip.
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Table 2.5. First, all complaints have a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship with increased competition from ride-sharing services, similar to what we found
with OLS. Second, both Poisson and Negative Binomial estimation provide similar
results. Third, the magnitude of the coefficients of all the complaints are smaller than
those from OLS. For instance, the coefficient of 1.008 for complaints pertaining to
discourteous behavior by taxi drivers translates to an increase in complaints at the
city-level by 2.5.21 The corresponding OLS coefficient is 4.7.
Given the count nature of complaints data and the potential non-linearity in the
relationship between increasing competition and complaints (it is unlikely that com-
plaints will keep rising at the same rate as Uber/Lyft activity continues to increase;
diminishing marginal effect is expected), we would prefer to use Poisson or Negative
Binomial estimation as our preferred specification when correcting for endogeneity
also. However, as of now, there are no established methods to estimate panel data
using Poisson and Negative Binomial estimation while also using instruments vari-
ables. Hence we present non-IV results only.
Given that all our data are either at the trip or incident level, we had the option of
aggregating by year, month, week, day or even hour. A question may arise regarding
our selection of aggregating at the weekly level. In making this choice, we had to
deal with the issue of excessive 0s in the data. Because most zones in most days do
not generate any complaints, the dependent variables contain a lot of 0s which cause
problems with linear estimation. In aggregating at the week (or something longer
than a week), we mitigate this problem. However, in Table 2.13, we post results
where the time unit is daily or monthly as opposed to weekly for contrast.
While aggregating at the monthly level lead to results similar to what we find with
weekly data (see Table 2.5), daily-level aggregation leads to very different numbers.
210.8%× 0.2× 263× 6 where 0.2 is the mean number of route complaints per zone in a week (see
Table 2.3), there are 263 taxi-zones and 6 represents the 6000 additional Uber/Lyft trips which is
the mean number of trips in the sample.
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We believe a linear specification does not capture the excessive 0s in the data well.
While aggregation at the monthly level provide similar results to weekly aggregation,
we prefer the latter because it allows us to use zone-quarter fixed effects as opposed to
zone-year fixed effects. Since we are dealing with several possible confounding factors
(see Section 2.3 above), and because quarter fixed effects absorb time-varying effects
at a finer level than year fixed effects, we believe it is important to be able to control
for as many of those confounding factors and at as fine a level as possible.
2.6 Mechanism
Our results and discussion provide a story of a connection between increased pene-
tration by Uber and Lyft and a resulting decrease in service quality provided by taxi
drivers. We want to find out what may be the mechanism linking the two. In other
words, why should it be the case that service quality goes down when Uber arrives?
To investigate one possible explanation, we use a different dataset of taxi trip data
that contain driver information.
The first batch of NYC taxi trip data the TLC released contain medallion numbers
and hack license numbers. Even though the numbers are scrambled, one can decode
the numbers to find out the identity of the taxi driver with relative ease. However,
this original dataset contain data for the year 2013 only; due to privacy concerns,
TLC released data for later years (2014, 2015, etc.) after removing the medallion and
hack license numbers entirely.
The complaints dataset that we have been using for the entirety of the paper also
provide hack license numbers for most of the drivers involved in the complaints inci-
dents. By matching the 2013 taxi trip data with 2013 complaint data, we generated
a dataset of complaints and taxi trips not at the zone level but at the driver level.
This is an important step up from the data that we have used for the rest of the
paper because the driver is the decision-making agent and the ability to observe their
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Figure 2.6: Number of drivers that left taxis in 2013, by month
behavior directly will allow us to test certain hypotheses.22
In particular, we analyze potential relationships between three different variables
– no. of complaints against individual drivers, their individual incomes and their
probability of exit, i.e. leaving taxis for another profession or perhaps to drive for
Uber. If Uber and Lyft did cause taxi driver incomes to fall, as is well documented in
the media and the literature, lower incomes may increase the probability of exit. As
Figure 2.6 shows, an increasing number of drivers have been exiting the taxi industry.
It is important to determine whether the drivers who remained with taxis generate
more complaints than those who exited.
In Table 2.14, we estimate the relationship between income and complaints. Co-
efficients for income are greater than 1 using all three estimation methods of OLS,
Negative Binomial and Poisson.23 Thus, income is positively correlated with com-
plaints implying that high-income drivers are also the ones who have more complaints
22Of course, it would have been ideal to have this driver-level data for all years 2013 to 2017 and not
just 2013.
23We report OLS coefficients in IRR form like we did in Table 2.12 for comparison purposes.
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Table 2.14: Relationship between Income and Complaints
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Neg. Bin. Poisson
Monthly Driver Income 1.012∗∗∗ 1.355∗∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.060) (0.092)
(Squared) Monthly Driver Income †1.000∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗ 0.992∗
†(0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Monthly Trips 0.996∗∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗ 0.951∗
(0.001) (0.017) (0.026)
Observations 394306 127397 127397
Adjusted R2 0.003
Log-Likelihood -35670.210 -36000.753
Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are reported for OLS and Poisson estimations and bootstrapped standard
errors are reported for the Negative Binomial estimation. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is driver-month. All
regressions include driver fixed effects. All coefficients are presented in the
form of incident-rate ratios, including those of OLS, for easier comparison
across regressions. †Truncated to maintain consistent format.
Table 2.15: Relationship between Complaints and Probability of Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yearly Complaints -0.108∗∗∗ 0.015 0.066∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.029)
Yearly Driver Income -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.000)† (0.000)† (0.002)




No. of months driver was active -0.363∗∗∗
(0.006)
Constant -1.218∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ 2.611∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.024) (0.025) (0.050)
Log-Likelihood -11381.969 -10122.998 -10120.753 -8267.750
N = 34, 425 in all columns. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The unit of observation is driver. †Truncated to
maintain consistent format. Probit MLE is used in all columns. Sample includes only
drivers who were active for at least 6 months in 2013.
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Figure 2.7: Average no. of complaints against drivers, by month
reported against them. We will not delve into why this is so but we emphasize that we
are not trying to establish causality. We also point out that since we control for trips,
the positive correlation between income and complaints is not because high-income
drivers drive more and hence generate more opportunities for passengers to be upset
with them.
In Table 2.15, we present results from Probit regressions where the unit of obser-
vation is a driver, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
driver exited during 2013 or 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the total no.
of complaints against each driver, their yearly income, trips, an interaction term of
income and complaints and the no. of months each driver was active during 2013.
In Column (1), complaints is the only covariate and we observe a negative rela-
tionship indicating that a driver with more complaints against him/her have a lower
probability of exit. But we have shown in Table 2.14 that income and complaints are
positively correlated. Once we control for the driver’s income in Column (2), we see
that the sign of the coefficient for complaints reverses while the coefficient for income
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is negative. This can be explained as follows. Lower income increases the probability
of exit, which is as expected. But more importantly, when comparing drivers with
similar incomes, those with more complaints against them have a higher probability
of exit, which is more reasonable than what the negative coefficient for complaints in
Column (1) is implying.
What is relevant to our analysis is that Uber’s negative impact on taxi driver
income has led to the exit of low -income drivers which in turn has led to higher
complaints since income and complaints are positively correlated. Figure 2.7 provides
additional evidence that the drivers who left were the ones who provided better
service quality. When they left and the high-complaints drivers remained, taxi service
quality declined overall not necessarily because the drivers changed their behavior
individually but rather the composition of the good vs. bad drivers changed.
2.7 Conclusion
The impact of platform-based businesses in general and ride-sharing services in par-
ticular has been extensive and widespread. In this paper, we look at one such impact,
that of increased competition from Uber and Lyft on taxi service quality. We use a
novel complaints dataset to measure (the lack of) service quality that to our knowl-
edge has not been analyzed before. Focusing on those dimensions of quality that
generate the largest numbers of complaints, we demonstrate that more competition
from these ride-sharing services has affected taxi drivers’ behavior adversely. In con-
trast to what we would expect, which is an improvement by incumbents when new
innovative challengers enter the market, we find a rise in high-frequency complaints
associated with the rise of Uber and Lyft.
The results are robust to a variety of controls, including taxi drivers’ market share,
a proxy for congestion and a host of fixed effects that absorb into them a variety of
confounding factors. Further, we address the potential simultaneity problem in the
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determination of Uber and Lyft trips, taxi trips and taxi complaints. We use well-
known instruments – Bartik shift-shares – for Uber/Lyft and taxis which we argue
are particularly suited to addressing simultaneity in this context. Not only do the
sign and statistical significance remain similar to that of OLS, our IV estimation leads
to an increase in the magnitude of the relationship between competition from Uber
and Lyft and taxi drivers’ quality of service in the case of most of the high-frequency
complaints we focus on.
We further provide evidence using data on individual taxi drivers that the likely
cause of complaints to rise is not because they changed their behavior individually
but rather because of a change in the composition of drivers. The arrival of Uber
and Lyft has caused low-income drivers to leave. We show that high-income drivers
tend to generate more complaints. Since these drivers remained with taxis whereas
the ones who had fewer complaints against left, complaints went up overall.
Ever since the launch of Uber and Lyft, Uber and Lyft have been the subject of
much policy debate and regulations, potential and actual. In August 2018, New York
City imposed a cap on the number of Uber and Lyft drivers that can operate in the
city.24 This highlights the need for a proper understanding of whether we truly need
such interventions and what are the potential consequences of such interventions.
We are cautious in assessing the policy implications of our paper, particularly
regarding passenger welfare. Our results do not necessarily imply that Uber and Lyft
made things worse for consumers. While taxi service quality has declined, we do not
know if there has been a net gain or loss in consumer welfare. It is possible that
many taxi users have switched to using ride-sharing services. If Uber and Lyft are
providing a quality of service higher than taxis were providing before the arrival of
these platforms, a large enough switch in riders from taxis to Uber and Lyft may have
24Fitzsimmons, E. (2018, August 8) Uber Hit With Cap as New York City Takes Lead in
Crackdown. New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/nyregion/uber-vote-city-council-cap.html
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caused an increase in aggregate welfare. While we do not argue for or against a cap
or a ban on ride-sharing services, we do point out the need to more fully understand
all primary and secondary effects of such interventions.
While the results in this paper may lead to a negative view of the arrival of ride-
sharing services, we should remember however that the blame should not be placed
on innovative entrants when the quality provided by incumbents deteriorate. The
goal of competition policy is to protect competition, not competitors. We hope that
our research provides valuable information for further discussion on how to improve
taxi quality in the face of competition from ride-sharing services.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 First Stage Regression Results
Table 2.16: First Stage Regressions
(1) (2)
No. of Uber and Lyft Pickups (000s) No. of Taxi Pickups (000s)
Predicted No. of Uber and Lyft trips (000s) 0.458∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.002)
Predicted No. of taxi trips (000s) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014)
No. of Boro Pickups (000s) 0.143∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.026) (0.016)
Avg. Taxi Trip Duration (minutes) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
Avg. Taxi Trip Distance (miles) -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004)
Avg. Tip per Trip 0.005∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 45024 45024
F statistic 180.7303 2659.613
F statistic p-value 0.000 0.000
S-W F statistic 2143.352 4701.789
S-W F test p-value 0.000 0.000
S-W χ2 2151.899 4720.537
S-W χ2 test p-value 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered at the taxi-zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. The unit of observation is a taxi-zone at the week level. All columns include zone-quarter fixed effects.
N = 16, 407 in each column. Period of analysis begins at April 2014 and ends December 2017 with missing values
for the months of October to December 2014. †All coefficients and p-values appearing as 0.000 are truncated to
maintain consistent format. S-W stands for Sanderson-Windmeijer tests of under- (F test) and weak-identification




UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF PRICE-MATCH GUARANTEES
3.1 Introduction
Price-match guarantees have been used by firms since at least 1947 (Edlin and Emch,
1999). Recent data show 12% of the top 500 retailers selling electronics and com-
puters price-match, while 50% of hardware and home improvement stores and 100%
of office supplies stores commit to such policies (Jiang et al., 2016). More recently,
brick-and-mortar stores have increasingly been price-matching online retailers.1 To
consumers, this may appear to be beneficial but economists, policymakers, and media
have long debated over whether such price-matching policies are pro-competitive or
anti-competitive.2
While the existing literature has demonstrated that price-match guarantees can
weaken price competition, become price-discrimination devices, or signal low prices,
the focus has primarily been on firm profits and consumer welfare. The impact of
price-matching on firms’ investment incentives and its effect on allocating production
to firms relative to the social optimum has not received sufficient attention yet, which
is this paper’s primary theme.
We use a standard Hotelling-type model of duopoly competition between a low-
cost online firm and a high-cost brick-and-mortar firm and consumers with hetero-
geneous preferences for online versus offline shopping. We consider timing where the
1For example, Best Buy adopted the following price-match policy, “At the time of sale, we [Best
Buy] price-match all local retail competitors (including their online prices) and we price-match
products shipped from and sold by these major online retailers: Amazon.com, Bhphotovideo.com,
Crutchfield.com, Dell.com, HP.com, Newegg.com, and TigerDirect.com.”
https://www.bestbuy.com/site/help-topics/best-buy-price-match-guarantee/
pcmcat297300050000.c?id=pcmcat297300050000 (Accessed on Jan 20, 2019.)
2See for example “Guaranteed profits: Price-match guarantees prevent rather than provoke price
wars” The Economist 12 Feb. 2015.
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brick-and-mortar firm first decides to adopt a price-match policy or not, after which
the firms engage in Stackleberg price competition with the online firm moving first.
We show three new unintended effects of price-match guarantees.
First, we find that investment incentives for both firms can be adversely affected
due to a price-match guarantee by the high-cost offline firm. To understand why, con-
sider the investment incentive for the high-cost firm without the price-match clause.
When the high-cost firm does not price-match, the incentive to cut cost is affected by
two channels: (i) it can expand its market share through more competitive pricing
via lowered cost (extensive margin effect) and (ii) it can increase the markup per
unit of sales by lowering the cost (intensive margin effect). However, with the price-
match strategy in place, the high-cost firm already secures half of the market and no
further market expansion is possible. Furthermore, price-matching necessitates the
offline firm to fully pass on its cost reduction to consumers, which mutes the incen-
tive through the improvement in markup. As a result, price-matching dampens the
brick-and-mortar firm’s incentive to invest in cost-reduction.
We find a similar impact of price-matching on the low-cost online firm’s incentive
to reduce cost. Unlike in the case of the brick-and-mortar firm implementing the
price-match, the online firm benefits from a higher markup due to the price-match if
it invests in cost reduction. However, the inability to gain market share due to the
price-match guarantee nullifies the extensive margin effect and the overall result is the
same as that of the brick-and-mortar firm—the incentive to invest in cost reduction
is weakened by a price-match.
Our second main result in the paper relates to the incentive to invest in upgrading
product or service quality. We augment the standard Hotelling model with quality
differences in the two products offered by the duopoly firms.3 Similar to what we show
in the case of distortion of cost-reduction incentives, we demonstrate that both firms
3Firms usually price-match identical items only, but the scope of differing from rivals in terms of
shipping speed, in-store customer service etc. still exist.
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have weaker incentives to invest in quality-enhancement with a price-match guarantee
in place. The difference is that, in contrast to the cost-reduction incentive, price-
matching may in some cases increase the incentive to invest in quality-enhancement.
This is because a relative merit in quality leads to a greater extensive margin even
with the price-match which is due to demand being affected by quality difference even
with a price-match, which is not true in the case of symmetric quality.
Our third primary finding relates to the well-known result that in a standard
Hotelling model with product differentiation, the firm with higher cost sells too large
a quantity relative to the social optimum. The reason why the low-cost firm sells too
few units in the Hotelling model is that when products are differentiated, the cost
advantage does not lead to a market share increase at full strength and thus some
loss of production efficiency is inevitable. Consumers’ relative preferences for products
cause frictions in that it prevents a low-cost producer from securing a larger market
share. To worsen this problem, price-matching has an effect of diluting the benefit of
having a competitive advantage in the relative cost. Hence, production inefficiency
arises in a less restrictive environment under price-matching; the exception is when
the price-matching firm’s product has a substantial quality superiority so that the
market split favors the societal outcome.
Our research reveals more reasons to suspect that the seemingly pro-competitive
price matching by many offline rivals to online sellers may have hidden social costs.
These hidden social costs may be important for policy evaluation over this common
business practice.
3.1.1 Related literature
The early literature on price-matching emphasized the anti-competitive aspect of this
practice. One plausible reason why a firm adopts a price-match policy is that it sends
a message to its rivals that they will not be able to increase sales by cutting price
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because the former will match that price and prevent buyers from switching. As long
as a firm can make such a promise credible, for instance by putting up a written notice
in its store or website, it ties itself to matching lower prices even in cases where it
is harmful to the firm. Given the credibility of the threat, firms move towards an
outcome of tacit collusion where they charge a price higher than they could have in
a non-cooperative outcome. In short, price-match policies can be anti-competitive.
This idea was first put forward by Hay, 1982 and Salop (1986) although Cooper
(1986)4 had earlier pointed out a similar effect of most-favored-customer clauses.5
Our paper is similar to this early strand in that firms price-match in equilibrium by
having equal posted prices, obviating the need for consumers to invoke the price-match
clause in equilibrium.
In contrast to the anti-competitive argument, it is easy to see why price-match
policies may benefit consumers. For example, if a buyer can get the lowest price
at the store closest to him by showing proof of a lower price at a store farther out
from his home, this saves him the trouble of a longer trip. Similarly, if he finds
something cheaper online but does not want to wait for the item to arrive, he can
immediately go to the local brick-and-mortar store that price-matches and get the
item at the lower online price. In addition, it is known that price-matching policies can
be pro-competitive if firms can adopt price-matching guarantees and price-beating
guarantees. There are no a priori reasons to preclude this given the lack of legal
barriers against either practice. This may allow a firm to post a price higher than
those of rivals and then offer to beat the rivals’ lower price by a certain amount.
As long as the rivals are price-matching posted prices, consumers cannot invoke the
price-match with rivals since the posted price of the firm with the price-beating policy
4The working paper version of Cooper’s paper is from 1981.
5Most-favored-customer clauses promise customers a refund of the price difference in case a firm
lowers price after the buyer purchases the item. In essence, the firm matches its own future price
rather than that of rivals. It has very similar potential implications for facilitating collusion. We
further discuss most-favored-customer clauses in Section 3.7.
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is higher. Meanwhile, the price-beating firm lures customers away from the rivals by
cutting actual prices below its rivals. This will lead to the rivals adopting the same
price-beating policy which in turn leads to non-collusive Bertrand price competition
(Corts, 1997; Hviid and Shaffer (1994)). However, Edlin (1997), Kaplan (2000) and
Arbatskaya et al. (2004) argue that tacit collusion is restored when firms match both
advertised and effective selling prices. Arbatskaya et al. (2006) provide data to show
that in some cases firms do price-match actual prices on top of advertised prices.
While tacit collusion has been the dominant theme to explain price-matching,
more recent literature has emphasized a different reason why firms price-match. Moor-
thy and Winter (2006) and Moorthy and Zhang (2006) argue that in a duopoly with
asymmetric costs, the low-cost firm uses a price-match guarantee to “signal” to un-
informed consumers its low-price advantage over the high-cost rival. They go on to
show why the high-cost rival will not find it in its interest to also adopt a price-match
guarantee. This lack of incentive ensures only the low-cost firm price-matches and
the signaling mechanism works in equilibrium to aid buyers identify the low-cost from
the high-cost firm. The issue with this narrative is the fact that high-cost brick-and-
mortar firms are increasingly adopting price-match policies that specifically match
prices of low-cost online firms. Because our model does not depend on consumers to
be informed about lower prices to benefit from the price-match guarantee since it is
the firm that takes up that burden, the need for signaling is moot. Hence we show
that it is the high-cost firm that adopts price-matching and not the low-cost firm.
The intuition is that the high-cost firm is more in need of inducing a collusive outcome
with higher prices to be able to cover its higher costs in contrast to the low-cost firm.
The empirical literature on price-matching provides evidence both for and against
such guarantees facilitating collusion. Grether and Plott (1984) find experiment ev-
idence that prices are significantly higher with adoption of most-favored-customer
clauses, which as we have mentioned earlier, potentially impact the incentives for
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tacit collusion in a way similar to price-matching. Hess and Gerstner (1991) finds ev-
idence specifically for price-matching. More recent work include that of Arbatskaya et
al. (2000), Arbatskaya, 2001 and Arbatskaya et al. (2006) which provide mixed results
regarding tacit collusion. Mañez (2006) finds that supermarkets used price-matching
to signal low prices, favoring the theory of Moorthy and Winter, 2006 and against col-
lusion. Jain and Srivastava (2000) and Srivastava and Lurie, 2001 find similar results
in experiments in favor of price-matching as low-price-signals. Cabral et al. (2018)
offer a simple model in which price matching guarantees can be a collusion-facilitating
practice and present its empirical evidence using the Shell network of gas stations in
Germany. One paper that most closely addresses the context we follow is by Zhuo
(2017). Using prices on online retailer Amazon before and after announcements of
price-match guarantees by traditional brick–and-mortar stores such as Walmart and
Target, she finds that Amazon prices rose after such announcements.
Our paper is related to Edlin and Emch (1999) in that they show welfare losses
arising not just due to higher prices as a result of price-matching, but over time these
higher prices induce excessive entry by firms which generate further welfare losses.
Our work is complementary to theirs. Instead of looking at firm entry and exit, we
attempt to uncover unintended effects of price-matching practices on investments and
production efficiency.
In terms of a theoretical framework, our model is similar to that of Logan and
Lutter, 1989 who considered differentiated product duopoly markets with asymmetric
costs. They find that the ability of price-match policies to sustain collusive prices
depends on whether the high-cost firm chooses to price-match. If the firms’ costs are
very different, the high-cost does not price-match and pricing is competitive. On the
other hand, if the firms’ costs are similar, the high-cost firm price-matches and pricing
is above the competitive level. While we uses a similar model to Logan and Lutter
(1989), we address very different questions to uncover new effects of price-matches.
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3.2 Equilbrium analysis of price-match guarantees
3.2.1 Model
We consider the standard Hotelling model of a duopoly. A continuum of consumers,
whose mass is normalized to one, are uniformly distributed over the linear city [0, 1].
Each consumer has a unit demand. A brick-and-mortar seller, firm B, at the left
corner (x = 0) and an online seller, firm O, at the right corner (x = 1) compete in
prices. A consumer closer to firm B has a stronger preference toward offline shopping
relative to online shopping. Heterogeneous preferences regarding online vs. offline
shopping may be attributed to different patience levels in waiting for an item to
arrive from the online seller, the different utility of shopping online such as saving
of time, less compulsive spending, no crowds relative to the inconvenience of the
inability to physically examine before purchasing items, concerns about online scams
and online privacy or security. The typical transport cost parameter t measures
the degree of the consumers’ relative preference intensity regarding the two different
modes of shopping.
Firm B’s cost of serving one consumer is c ∈ R+ whereas firm O’s is normalized to
zero. We motivate the assumption of asymmetric costs by using the example of online
vs. brick-and-mortar firms. It is generally true that online firms locate warehouses
in remote areas with lower costs which allows for carrying much greater inventory
and for greater economies of scale. The need to bring in customers constrains brick-
and-mortar retail stores to locate in high-traffic areas and hence they face a cost
disadvantage. Moreover, often online retailers operate marketplaces allowing them to
offer goods through third-party sellers and which further reduces costs by eliminating
the need to carry inventory.6 A particular trend since online shopping became main-
6While throughout the paper we use the online vs. offline example, our results naturally extend to
cases where there is cost asymmetry between firms due to factors other than those that
differentiate online and brick-and-mortar firms. The implications of cost asymmetry are important
for our results, but the reason for the asymmetry is not.
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stream has been the closure of brick-and-mortar firms, big and small, as they failed
to compete with online firms with a cost advantage such as Amazon.7
We assume that the market is fully covered and thus each firm is not a local
monopoly. The timing of the game between the two firms is as follows. At the initial
node firm B decides whether to price-match or not. While in reality the online firm
may price-match as well, only a few online-only sellers such as eBay and NewEgg offer
price-match guarantees. Hence, we opted to study the case of the brick-and-mortar
firm adopting a price-match, which has become far more common lately.
We assume the decision to price-match or not is irrevocable. The sequence of
deciding first to price-match or not and then choosing prices is reasonable, since
firms change prices frequently whereas they tend to stick to price-matching (or not)
for a longer period. The proposed timing also justifies our assumption of irrevocability
as long as the duration of the game we study is shorter or equal to the period during
which a firm does not change its price-matching policy.
In the subgame in which firm B does not choose to price-match, we consider
the sequential-move game8 in which firm O acts as the price leader and firm B the
follower. In the subgame following firm B deciding to price-match, firm B’s choice
of price following firm O’s choice is automatic and trivial. The analysis proceeds
backward from the two subgames following the brick-and-mortar firm’s commitment
decision. The equilibrium concept is subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium.
3.2.2 No price-match subgame
Consider the subgame ensuing from firm B’s choice not to price-match. We char-
acterize the demand for each firm by identifying the indifferent consumer’s loca-
7See for example Evangelista, Benny. “How ‘Amazon factor’ killed retailers like Borders, Circuit
City,” SFGATE July 14, 2015. https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/
How-Amazon-factor-killed-retailers-like-6378619.php
8In the Online Appendix, we show that price-matching does not arise in a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the simultaneous-move game.
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, which gives the demand for B, QB(pB, pO) = x, and for O,
QO(pB, pO) = 1 − x. The notation is self-explanatory: pB and pO are respectively
B’s price and O’s price and QB and QO are demands. We start with B’s profit
maximization problem: max
pB
πB = (pB − c)QB which renders the following best re-
sponse function of pB(pO) =
1
2
(t + pO + c). Firm B’s best-response plays the role of














(t+ pO + c).













In theory, there are two different cases depending on the primitive parameters c
and t. If c ≤ t, then firm B’s price is lower than firm O’s, p∗O ≥ p∗B, where the equality
holds for c = t. In this case consumers find no need to claim the price-match—even
if firm B committed to such a policy—as they find the online price is higher than the
offline price. In contrast, if the offline firm’s cost disadvantage is large enough such
that c > t, then p∗O < p
∗
B. Let us assume c > t for subsequent analyses to ensure that
the offline’s marginal cost is not so low that its price-match becomes irrelevant for
subsequent price competition.
In the absence of firm B’s price-match, the pair of prices in (3.1) constitute the
equilibrium prices. Each firm’s profit is computed as
π∗B = x
∗ (p∗B − c) =
(5t− c)2
32t




For firm B to gain a positive market share (i.e. x∗ > 0), we need c < 5t. Additionally,
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Figure 3.1: Best-response and isoprofit functions with and without price-match




This outcome would occur at point E in Figure 1.
3.2.3 Price-match subgame
In the presence of the price-match commitment, the online seller’s price choice is
bounded by a convex set composed of a 45-degree line from the origin to point M and
then follows BRB beyond point M; the relevant edges are shaded. Firm O obtains its
highest profit when its iso-profit curve passes through point M. Hence, the equilibrium
prices are determined at the intersection of pO = pB and pB =
1
2




O = t+ c (3.3)
where the subscript m again indicates the price-match in consideration. At equal
prices, each firm’s profit is computed as
πmB = x
m (pmB − c) =
t
2





where xm = 1
2
. The sufficient condition for full market coverage is v − txm − pm ≥ 0,
which is simplified as v ≥ 3
2




c for c ≥ t.
But note that we need to check when both firms do not deviate from the given
price, pm = t+ c. Suppose that the online firm attempts to monopolize the market by
deviating to pdO = c − t so that the least interested consumer at x = 0 would prefer
buying from firm O to buying from firm B even if firm B follows and sets its most
competitive price, c. Then, firm O’s deviation payoff would be πdO = c− t. Thus, no
deviation requires πdO ≤ πmO ⇔ c− t ≤ t+c2 , we have c ≤ 3t.
3.2.4 Price-match or not
For the price-match decision, throughout this paper we consider the following set of
parameters:
Assumption 4. v > 3
2
t+ c and c ∈ [t, 3t]
Since firm B’s price-match decision depends on the relative size of the continuation
payoffs π∗B and π
m
B , we can say that the price-match will be chosen if







(c− t) (9t− c)
32t
> 0 (3.5)
which is satisfied under Assumption 4. Graphically, it is clear from Figure 3.1 that
firm B’s isoprofit curve passing through point M is above the one passing through
point E.
In summary, under Assumption 4, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
sequential pricing is characterized by the path on the price-match. The equilibrium
prices and payoffs are given by (3.3) and (3.4).
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3.3 Static effects of price-matching
Having characterized the equilibrium in which a brick-and-mortar firm with a cost
disadvantage finds it better to adopt the price-match guarantees, we show how the
price-match guarantees affect the online rival, consumers and social welfare though
these static effects do not constitute our main research results.
3.3.1 Effect on online rival
How would the price-match guarantees adopted by the offline seller affect its online
rival? The impact on firm O can be examined by studying how firm O’s payoff
changes with the price-match compared to that without it. First of all, let us recall
the standard result, which is obtained in our model as well, that a price-match com-
mitment can soften price competition. Under Assumption 4, price-matching increases
equilibrium prices relative to no price-match prices:
pmO − p∗O =
1
2
(c− t) > 0; pmB − p∗B =
1
4
(c− t) > 0.
However, the higher prices do not necessarily imply that the online seller also
benefits from weakened competition. The comparison between firm O’s payoff with
the price-match and without it can be decomposed into two opposing forces:















On the one hand, firm B’s price-match weakens price competition, which makes firm
O enjoy a higher per-unit markup on existing sales, captured by the first term on
the right-hand side of the equation above. On the other hand, firm O loses market
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share due to the price-match policy, represented by the second term above. We
find that price-matching makes the online seller earn less profit because the negative
market-share effect outweighs the positive mark-up effect. Graphically, it is clear
from Figure 3.1 that firm B’s isoprofit curve passing through point M is to the left of
the one passing through point E.
3.3.2 Effect on consumers
Antitrust concerns are usually focused more on the impact on consumers than on
rivals. We showed that equilibrium prices increase due to price-matching. Does this
necessarily imply that all consumers will be worse off? To answer this question, let
us start by noticing that there are three groups of consumers who are affected by a
price-match guarantee differently based on their location. First, consumers located




) buy from firm B regardless of price-matching. These
buyers are worse off because pmB > p
∗
B. Similarly, the consumers located in x ∈ [12 , 1]
always buy from firm O and they also become worse off because pmO − p∗O > 0. In






) would have bought from firm O
without the price-match but switch to firm B in the presence of the price-match.
Hence, the net surplus of a consumer x in this group is computed as V ∗(p∗O, x) =





under no price-match and V m(pmB , x) = v − tx − (t+ c) under
the price-match guarantees. The net change in consumer surplus denoted by ∆V (x)
is given by
∆V (x) ≡ V m(pmB , x)− V ∗(p∗O, x) = −
1
2
(c− t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect (-)
+ t(1− 2x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
preference effect (+)
(3.6)
A consumer switching due to the price-match ends up paying the higher price pmB =
t+c compared to p∗O =
3t+c
2
without the price-match. The first term in (3.6) captures
this negative price effect. However, this switching consumer now saves on “travel
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costs” by choosing a more preferred mode of shopping given equal prices by both
firms. The second term measures this positive preference effect. Note that ∆V (x)
decreases with x because the price effect is independent of x, but the preference effect





(and there is no preference effect for x = 1/2). But we can verify that even this









(c− t) < 0 which








The total consumer surplus denoted by S is computed from aggregating all con-




(v − tx− pmB )dx+
∫ 1
1/2








(v − tx− p∗B)dx+
∫ 1
x∗












. The difference in aggregate consumer surplus due to the price-
match is
∆S = Sm − S∗ = −(c− t) (c+ 23t)
64t
< 0
which verifies that price-matching leads to a decrease in consumer surplus as every
consumer is worse off from the higher prices due to the price-match policy and she is
not sufficiently compensated for the loss by a positive preference effect.
9Note that we use S for consumer surplus and later use W for social welfare.
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3.3.3 Effect on social welfare
Since total welfare is the sum of firm profits and consumer surplus, the welfare effects
of price-matching are consistent with what we have described regarding firm profits
and consumer surplus. One notable point is how the change in firm B’s profit due to
the price-match is substantial relative to the impact on its rival and consumers.
Using prior results, we can obtain the welfare with and without price-match as
follows: Wm = πmB +π
m
O +CS
m and W ∗ = π∗B +π
∗
O +CS
∗ from which the net change
in welfare is given by
∆W ≡ Wm −W ∗ = −(c− t) (7c+ t)
64t
< 0. (3.7)
The offline seller’s gain is not enough to offset the loss to consumers and the decrease
in online rival’s profits. We summarize our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 4, the price-match guarantees have the effects,
compared to the no price-match benchmark, that (i) the online firm is worse off, and
(ii) each consumer receives smaller net surplus, and thus social welfare decreases.
3.4 The incentive to invest in cost reduction
Here we extend the baseline model to discuss unintended effects of price-match guar-
antees. How would price-matching affect the incentive of the brick-and-mortar seller
to reduce its marginal cost, equivalently its cost disadvantage c? What about the in-
centive of the online seller to widen the cost advantage? To address these questions,
we add a new stage to the timing of the game. Let either firm make investments
after firm B’s decision to offer a price-match guarantee but before price competition.
We could explicitly model investment cost functions, but our analysis does not make
it imperative. This is because essentially we end up comparing the marginal benefit
of such investments with the price-match and without it, which means the marginal
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cost of investment is not crucial for analysis, unless if we were specifically interested
in the optimal choice of investment level. Instead we assume a one-time fixed cost F
of investing in the cost-reduction technology and that the size of F does not depend
on whether a price-match guarantee is offered or not.
3.4.1 Incentive for firm B
Consider first the investment incentive for firm B. Using the equilibrium payoffs we







− F . With price-matching, the marginal change in firm B’s profit in













intensive margin effect = 0







extensive margin effect = 0
= 0. (3.8)
The first term in (3.8) measures the effect of a reduction in cost on the mark-up for
each unit of existing sales. A decrease in the marginal cost by a dollar means an
increase in profit due to the improved per-unit mark-up; however, its effect on the
price is given by
∂pmB
∂c
. Recalling that pmB = t+ c, the price goes up by the exact same
amount. The two effects, the change in cost and the change in price, are exactly
offset.10 The second term in (3.8) measures the extensive margin effect, which arises
via a change in the market share. Under the price-match guarantee, the extensive
margin does not change because the firms must necessarily split the market in half




= 0. Firm B has no incentive to invest in cost-reduction under
10This is unique to the uniform distribution and in theory the intensive margin effect may go either
way if other distributions are used to model consumer preferences.
11This is driven by the assumption in the Hotelling model that total market size is constant. We
thank Keisuke Hattori for this observation. Hence our results are limited to cases where, for some
reason, no further market expansion is possible. We can use the ‘hinterland’ model to extend our


















intensive margin effect > 0












In contrast to the case of price-matching, there is a positive intensive margin effect
without price-matching. The lower cost improves the mark-up since the market price
does not increase as much as with a price-match, i.e. one-to-one. In addition, the
cost-reduction has a positive effect on the extensive margin for firm B. With both
intensive and extensive margin effects being positive, firm B has a greater incentive
to invest to reduce cost in a no-price-match regime.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 4, price-matching by the high-cost firm weakens
its incentive to reduce its cost disadvantage.
3.4.2 Incentive for firm O
We apply an analogous analysis for the online firm’s investment to expand its cost
advantage by raising c.12 Firm O’s equilibrium payoffs are πmO =
t+c
2
− F with price-
matching and π∗O =
(3t+c)2
16t
− F without. Recalling that pmO = t + c and 1 − xm = 12 ,





















12Recall that for simplicity in analysis, we opted to include the single cost parameter c to reflect the
asymmetry in cost between the two firms instead of two separate cost parameters. In that sense,





and 1− x∗ = 1− 5t−c
8t
, firm O’s investment incentive without price-


















, firm O’s incentive to invest in cost-reduction is weakened like in the
case of firm B. However, to see why this is the case, we again look at the intensive and
extensive margin effects with and without price-matching. Price-matching eliminates
the extensive margin effect just as in the case of firm B (see Footnote 10) whereas
it is possible for firm O to snatch market share away from firm B by reducing cost
when there is no price-matching. Unlike in the case of firm B however, the intensive









under Assumption 4). The net effect remains stronger
without price-matching nevertheless. This implies that, under a price-match, the
inability to gain market share outweighs any gains from a higher markup due to a
bigger cost advantage.
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 4, price-matching by the high-cost firm weakens
the low-cost firm’s incentive to increase its cost advantage.
3.5 The incentive to invest in upgrading quality
So far we have assumed that the two firms offer products identical in quality, i.e.,
vB = vO = v. But the online and offline firms may differ in their other features such
as warranty, shipping, or return policies. For instance, brick-and-mortar stores may
try to enhance in-store services by hiring more staff and offering pick-up services for
online orders. We introducing a quality difference to analyze the impact of price-
matching on either firms’ incentive to invest in upgrading such quality dimensions
like shipping speed.
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Define α = vO−vB. Then, α denotes the online firm’s quality superiority if α > 0
or its quality inferiority for α < 0, and α = 0 representing the special case of same
quality that we have used in our prior analyses. Usually a cost reduction is a mirror
image to a quality improvement, and vice versa. However, this general intuition
may not hold in our model. This is because the change in the quality difference α
affects the equilibrium market demand under price-match, which is not the case with
changes in the cost difference c. Building on this insight, we analyze firm B’s incentive
to decrease α and firm O’s incentive to increase α. Since the derivation procedures
are similar to those in the basic model, we skip them. However, with the presence of
α, we need a revised version of the full coverage market assumption (x∗ > 0) and the
range of values of c in which price-matching arises in equilibrium:
Assumption 5. vB ≥ 32t+ c−
3
2
α and c ∈ [t+ 5
3
α, 3t+ α] and t ≥ 3α.
Note that for α = 0, Assumption 5 collapses to Assumption 4.
3.5.1 Incentive for firm B
We proceed to analyzing firm B’s incentive to lower its quality inferiority. Given
xm(α) = t−α
2t













intensive margin effect > 0
+ (pmB (α)− c) (−xm′(α))︸ ︷︷ ︸





Note that firm B’s market share under price-matching is a function of the quality
difference parameter α. As a result, the marginal effect of a quality-enhancing invest-
ment on market share is no longer zero, i.e., −xm′(α) = 1
2t
> 0. In contrast, market
share is not a function of the cost parameter c and hence any cost reduction has no





. The condition for a weakening of investment incentive under price-matching
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is characterized by





(t+ 3c) ≡ ᾱB. (3.13)
That is, if firm O’s quality superiority is large enough, price-matching leads to a lower
incentive for the brick-and-mortar firm B to invest in upgrading quality. Otherwise,
price-matching increases firm B’s motivation to enhance quality. This is because as we
mentioned above the extensive margin effect turns out positive under the price-match,
which was not the case when we studied cost-reducing investment.
Proposition 9. Under Assumption 5, price-matching weakens the brick-and-mortar
firm’s incentive to invest in quality-improvement if α > ᾱB, but strengthens it other-
wise.
3.5.2 Incentive for firm O
We can examine firm O’s incentive to improve quality in a similar manner. The intu-
ition applied to the online firm is the same – the extensive margin effect is no longer
zero even with price-matching. Firm B’s incentive to enhance quality is weakened
with a price-match guarantee if




(c− 3t) ≡ αO. (3.14)
Price-match guarantees decreases firm O’s incentive to invest in quality if its quality is
sufficiently superior, i.e. α > ᾱO. However, in contrast to the investment incentives
in the cost-reduction case, if firm O’s product is either inferior or not sufficiently
superior, price-matching strengthens firm O’s incentive to upgrade quality.
Proposition 10. Under Assumption 5, price-matching weakens the brick-and-mortar
firm’s incentive to invest in quality-improvement if α > ᾱO, but strengthens it other-
wise.
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3.6 Production inefficiency of price-matching
In this section, we examine the effect of price-matching on the well-known result of
production inefficiency in the standard Hotelling model with asymmetric costs – the
firm with the higher cost sells too large a quantity relative to the social optimum.13
The reason why the low-cost firm sells too few units in the Hotelling model is that
when products are differentiated, the cost advantage does not lead to a market share
increase at full strength. In other words, consumers’ relative preferences for different
products, beyond a simple price comparison, causes frictions from a social efficiency
perspective. These frictions in consumers’ switching prevents the low-cost producer
from securing the socially efficient market share.
Let us first confirm this point in our model. Note that the social optimum requires
marginal-cost pricing and hence p̃O = 0 and p̃B = c in our model. With marginal-
cost pricing, firm B’s socially optimal market share is computed as x̃(c, 0) = t−c−α
2t
.
Under Assumption 5, firm B prefers price-matching and its market share is xm = t−α
2t
.
Hence, the socially optimal market share for firm B is less than firm B’s market share




, which holds for any c > 0. This means that
price-matching itself does not fix the production inefficiency problem.
To find out whether price-matching mitigates or aggravates the distortion in pro-
duction, we need to compare firm B’s market share with price-matching and its mar-
ket share without price-matching. The comparison shows that the price-matching
increases firm B’s market share even more if
xm(pmB , p
m
O ) > x
∗(pαO, p
α
B)⇐⇒ α > t− c. (3.15)
Hence, price-matching exacerbates production inefficiency with α > t− c. It implies
that the product inefficiency problem can worsen even if the high-cost firm B has a
13See Lesson 3.4 on pg. 54 of Belleflame and Peitz (2015).
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quality advantage (α < 0). On the other hand, the price-match guarantee will reduce
the distortion if α < t − c, which requires that firm B’s quality is better than firm
O’s by a sufficiently large margin.
Intuitively, the price-match guarantee dilutes the benefit of having a competitive
advantage in relative cost. Consequently, the production inefficiency arises in a less
restrictive environment under price-matching. Only when the high-cost firm’s product
shows a substantial quality superiority, the market split due to the price-match favors
the societal outcome.14
Proposition 11. Under Assumption 2, price-matching aggravates the production in-
efficiency problem when either the high-cost firm’s quality is inferior to or not suffi-
ciently superior to the low-cost firm’s quality, i.e. α > t− c.
3.7 Discussion and conclusion
The scope of our paper is such that we do not consider certain other issues related
to price-matching. First, we ignore the possibility of brick-and-mortars using price-
matching to prevent the practice of “show-rooming”. Wu et al. (2015) and Mehra
et al. (2017) address this issue. Second, the presence of “hassle costs” may limit the
the anti-competitive aspect of price-matching . If the burden of proving the existence
of lower prices elsewhere falls on the buyer, this usually entails him a) searching
for a lower price, b) bringing proof in the form of a flyer, printout or display of an
advertisement on smartphone, etc., c) potentially filling out paperwork (some stores
require registration) d) waiting for a store employee to process the claim, and so on.
Even after incurring such costs, the buyer may not always get the price-match due
to failing to comply with all the conditions or due to inconsistent implementation of
such policies by store employees. Hviid and Shaffer, 1999 show that the presence of
14All the results in this section hold in the symmetric quality case also (α = 0), albeit with simpler
interpretations due to the absence of α.
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even small hassle costs can diminish, if not eliminate, the collusive implications of
price-match policies.
The caveat of the argument for hassle costs is that it holds when the burden of
price-matching is mostly on the customer. If however firms undertake the responsibil-
ity of matching their rivals’ prices and keep their posted prices equal to those of rivals,
consumers face no hassle costs. Although we often observe both price dispersion and
buyers bringing in rivals’ advertisements to get price-matches, which is the criticism
by Corts (1997) of non-hassle-costs based models of price-matching, there is a recent
trend where the sellers are trying to minimize the hassle of price-matching. This may
be because the sellers are becoming aware of how hassle costs limit the effectiveness
of price-match guarantees. For instance, in 2014, Walmart announced a smartphone
app that will search for lower prices elsewhere and issue refunds automatically as long
as customers upload their Walmart receipts on to the app.15 This is more prevalent
in the U.K. where Asda, Tesco and Sainsbury’s offer similar price-match guarantees
in which the burden of finding lower prices and refunding the buyer falls on the seller.
Price-matching as a price discrimination device is an alternative argument that
seeks to explain why firms price-match (see Png and Hirshleifer (1987) and Corts,
1997 among others). When a price-matching firm has posted a price higher than
the rivals’ prices, only a small percentage of customers tend to exercise price-match
guarantees. This is not surprising if hassle costs are high and the burden on obtaining
the price-match is on the buyer. At the same time the potentially heterogeneous hassle
costs play a role of self-selectively separating buyers into two types: high hassle-cost
consumers who do not bother price-matching and low hassle-cost consumers who
do. Hence, the firm manages to charge the regular high price to the high-type and
the discounted price after price-matching to the low-type. Because in our model




we consider the case where posted prices are already equal due to a price-match
guarantee, studying the possibility of and implications for price discrimination is
beyond the scope of your paper.
We also ignore the implications of price-match guarantees on consumer search.
Price-match guarantees is likely to influence how long consumers keep searching for a
lower price and also their reservation prices, which in turn can affect optimal pricing
by firms. Two papers that study that are Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013) and
Yankelevich and Vaughan (2016). Once again, equal posted prices in our model
eliminate the need to analyze this aspect.
A literature on most-favored-customer (MFC) clauses16 as a collusion-facilitating
device runs parallel to the one on price-matching and price-beating guarantees.17 In
a two-period duopoly in which the firms choose prices simultaneously in each period,
Cooper, 1986 shows that a firm has an unilateral incentive to offer a MFC clause
to its customers. By combining a MFC clause with a higher than Bertrand-Nash
non-cooperative price in the first period, it commits itself to that price in the second
period. It acts like a price-leader since its first period price influences its rival’s price
in the second period. Similar to price-match guarantees, MFCs can lead to tacit
collusion. While it may be interesting to see whether the results we get regarding
distortion of investment incentives and production inefficiency also materialize with
MFCs, they are not as common today as they were a few decades back and hence we
do not pursue it here.
In this paper we illustrate three unintended effects of price-matching in a standard
differentiated product duopoly market. Economists have studied various incentives
for and effects of price-matching guarantees and similar business practices, but to
our knowledge, the potential impact on investment incentives associated with price-
16Footnote 6 in Section 3.1.1 explains how most-favored-customer clauses are implemented.
17See Hviid and Shaffer (2010) for references. There are also some papers that consider both
most-favored-customer and price-match clauses together, including Hviid and Shaffer (2010) and
Holt and Scheffman (1987).
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matching has not been given sufficient attention, and we try to fill the gap in this
paper. Also, we illustrate how price-matching can aggravate the distortion of the
high-cost firm producing too much relative to what is socially optimal.
Appendix: The simultaneous pricing game
Suppose that firm B did not choose to price-match. Then, generally we can think
of an alternative version of price competition that the two firms compete with their
simultaneous price choices. For this simultaneous pricing game, we use the hat symbol
(ˆ) for each variable to make them distinct from the variables in the sequential pricing
game where we do not use the hat symbol.
The analysis when there was no price-match by firm B is straightforward. As
usual, the analysis starts with characterizing the demand for each firm by identifying




, which gives the demand for B,
Q̂B(p̂B, p̂O) = x̂, and for O, Q̂O(p̂B, p̂O) = 1 − x̂. Then, we set up each firm’s profit
maximization problem. For firm B, it is set up as max
p̂B
π̂B = (p̂B − c)Q̂B and for
firm O as max
p̂O
π̂O = p̂OQ̂O. Deriving the first-order necessary conditions for their
prices, we obtain following two best responses: p̂B(p̂O) =
1
2
(t+ p̂O + c) and p̂O(p̂B) =
1
2









where the asterisk at the subscript (∗) signifies that we are considering the stan-
dard price competition without a price-match. Substituting (3.16) into x̂(p̂B, p̂O), the














As firm B’s marginal cost is higher than that of firm O, the demand for firm B is
99
smaller than that of firm O. The demand gap c
3t
increases with c, but decreases with
t. Using the derived prices and demands, the equilibrium profits are equal to
π̂∗B = (p̂
∗
B − c) x̂∗ =
(3t− c)2
18t
; π̂∗O = p̂
∗




For an interior solution x̂∗ ∈ (0, 1), we need c < 3t without which the market
equilibrium is characterized by the so-called tipping equilibrium such that the online
seller monopolizes the market. Intuitively, this corner solution arises when the cost
disadvantage c is sufficiently large that firm B cannot survive as an effective com-
petitor vis-à-vis the more efficient online rival. Aforementioned, we assume a full
market coverage. The net surplus of the indifferent consumer must be non-negative,
i.e. v− tx̂∗− p̂∗B ≥ 0 where v denotes the intrinsic value of a product. This condition




c. Intuitively, the market will be fully covered once the intrinsic
value is large enough.
Now consider the other subgame ensuing from the brick-and-mortar firm’s price-
match commitment. Under the price-match announcement, one candidate for the
equilibrium would be that the market will be evenly split as long as both firms are
active and they charge the same price. In this case the marginal consumer is located
at x̂∗ = 1/2 and both firms charge the price such that they extract the entire surplus
from the marginal consumer:
p̂mO = p̂
m




where the superscript m indicates that currently we consider the price-match. The














where firm B will be active only if v ≥ t/2 + c. Both of the constraints on price
and no-exclusion of firm B at the matched price are subsumed by the full coverage





However, before we can assert that (3.20) represent the price-match subgame
payoffs, we need to check whether p̂mO = p̂
m
B = v − t2 is sustained as an equilibrium
pricing strategy. In fact, this is not an equilibrium. To see this point, consider firm
B’s deviation to p̂dB = v − t. Then, consumers see no need to claim the price match
because now p̂dO = v − t2 > p̂
m
B = v − t. Firm B’s new payoff is π̂dB = v − t − c and
this deviation strategy is profitable if





that is, v > c+ 3t
2
. This condition has no conflict with any restriction to the equilibrium
and basically it boils down to v being sufficiently high, which is consistent with
the full coverage assumption. This implies that there will be no equilibrium with
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